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ABSTRACT

Democracy is complex regime type, one that has been analyzed extensively. Yet the intricate
nature of a democratic regime, and the challenges associated with keeping it running effectively,
make it a continued object of scholarly research. Some countries with regimes that can be
considered democratic maintain their democracies more effectively than others. This study
attempts to analyze factors that have obstructed democratization in three non-Western countries:
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.
My first goal is to outline processes of state creation and regime building in Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, and Iran. A democratic regime cannot evolve without a state structure in place,
nor can it develop immediately when leaders of a state begin a process of regime building.
Democracy takes time, and in fact, it is rarely the ultimate goal of the leaders of a state. After
exploring the processes of state creation and regime building in the three countries, I explore
reasons as to why none of these states has democratized.
My second goal is to conduct a comparative analysis of the three countries, and to create
a tentative theory of state creation, regime building, and lack of democratization across the
cases. The case of Jordan forms the basis of the theoretical framework, and the other two cases,
Saudi Arabia and Iran, build upon it. My goal in creating a theory is twofold: I first intend to
evaluate how applicable existing theories are to these three cases. I then intend to create a
theory that takes into account the processes of state creation and regime building present in the
cases. I also intend to design a theory that could be extrapolated to other cases in the Middle
East, and beyond, to help explain their respective processes of state creation, regime building,
and democratization.
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TRANSLITERATION DISCLAIMER

The transliteration between the native languages of the countries outlined in the following cases
and English is not standardized. There is no single way to translate Persian or Arabic character
sounds into the English alphabet. For example, the name ‘Mohammad’ can also be spelled
‘Muhammed’, ‘Muhammad’, or ‘Mohammed’. The transliteration in this study strives for
consistency and reflects the spelling in English that most closely resembles the sounds of the
original Persian or Arabic characters, in the opinion of the author.
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USEFUL TERMS

All Cases

•

Caliphate—the Islamic empire. Eventually, the original caliphate broke into multiple
ones as the empire expanded.
o Caliph—the leader of the Islamic empire.

•

The Hajj—the holy pilgrimage to Mecca that is required of every adult Muslim at least
once in his or her lifetime.

•

Imam—a senior religious figure in Islam, usually the leader of a mosque who leads
prayers.

•

Mecca—the birthplace of Islam, and the holiest city in Islam. It is the location to which
hundreds of thousands of Muslims travel each year during the Hajj. Located in presentday Saudi Arabia.

•

Medina—the city established by the Prophet Mohammad and his followers when those in
Mecca initially rejected his religion of Islam. Another holy city in Islam. Located in
present-day Saudi Arabia.

•

The Prophet Mohammad—the founder of Islam in the early 7th century AD.

•

Qur’an—the holy text in Islam.

•

Rentier System— reliance on outside subsidies for economic support, usually based on
outside purchases of a lucrative natural resource, such as oil. This process results in a
distributive rather than productive economy. The government distributes oil profits to the
population rather than developing a reciprocal relationship with society through the
means of production. Therefore, the regime in this type of economic system is not held
accountable to the population since the population does not contribute to the state’s
economy through the usual process of taxation.

•

Shari ‘a—the rules and laws outlined in the Qur’an. More generally, it is guidelines by
which to live life. The strictest interpretation is favored by the Hanbali school of law.

•

Shia Islam—literally meaning “followers of Ali”. Ali was the cousin and son-in-law of
the Prophet Mohammad, and he eventually split with the original caliphs. Those who
rallied around him believed that, as a descendent of the Prophet, he was the rightful
leader of the Islamic empire, as were his descendants.
vii

o Twelver Shiism—The largest branch of Shia Islam. The predominant branch of
Shiism practiced in Iran. Those who practice it believe in a Hidden 12 th Imam
who will eventually return from occultation to lead his followers.
•

Sunni Islam—the predominant form of Islam practiced worldwide. Those who practice it
do not believe in hereditary rule, as Shia Muslims do.

•

Ulema—a group of religious figures and leaders in Islam. A religious council.

Jordan
•

Emir—the name for the ruler of Transjordan.

•

Feyadeen—members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) who launched
attacks out of Jordan against Israel, as well as caused violence within Jordan.

•

Intifada—an uprising, literally meaning a “shaking off” in Arabic. The PLO launched
several of these uprisings to challenge Israeli power and control in Palestine.

•

Tanzimat Reforms—reforms initiated by the Ottomans during the 19th century that
attempted to increase the consolidation of Ottoman power in areas of its empire far from
the central leadership. These reforms were the precursor to state-building. Arab leaders
were introduced to the idea of constructing a government structure and its various organs,
such as a parliament. The reforms also stressed the rule of law, the importance of
elections, and the notion of citizenship to political identity.

•

Vilayet—a governorship under the Ottomans designed to be an outpost of their power in a
specific, often far-off, location.

Saudi Arabia
•

Fatwah—a religious decree in Islam.

•

Ikhwan—the Bedouin-comprised military force established in 1912 by Ibn Saud.

•

Wahhabi Islam— Eighteenth century puritanical revivalist movement in Islam.
Sometimes used interchangeably with Salafism, Wahhabism calls for a literal
interpretation of Islam. It falls outside of the four main law schools of Sunni Islam and is
the state religion of Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
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Iran
•

Ayatollah—literally, “sign of God,” the highest-ranking figure in Shia Islam below an
Imam. In Twelver Shiism, he is responsible for taking the place of the Hidden 12 th Imam
until the return of the Hidden Imam.

•

Fatwah—a religious decree in Islam.

•

Majles—a council of political figures that forms a legislative political body.

•

Shah—King of Iran, the title used during the monarchy.
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INTRODUCTION

Democracy is often unintentional, is rarely perfect, is challenging to create, and requires constant
upkeep. If this is so, then why and how do democratic regimes form? And, in the case of the
countries discussed in this study, what factors have prevented democracy from taking hold?
Before such questions can be answered, I ask the following questions: What factors lead to state
creation and consolidation, which are themselves prerequisites for democratization? Once a state
is in place, what factors lead to the creation and building of certain types of regimes, and why do
democracies form in some cases and not in others?
Most of the literature on these subjects revolves around Western processes of state
creation, regime building, and democratization. The factors that have been designated as
necessary for these processes to ensue have been derived from Western models. Other regions
have been analyzed in the context of Western factors, but specific countries’ processes within
those regions are rarely differentiated. For example, the region that this study deals with, the
Middle East, is usually studied and analyzed as an aggregate, i.e., state creation, regime building,
and democratization, or lack thereof, are analyzed in terms of the region rather than in terms of
individual countries. There are no countries in the region, save for Israel, which can be
considered democracies; therefore the Middle East presents scholars of state creation and regime
building with a multitude of case studies to analyze.
This study is guided by several objectives. My first objective is to delineate the
processes of state creation and regime building of three countries in the Middle East: Jordan,
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Saudi Arabia, and Iran. 1 It is not possible to understand how the political regime of a state came
into being without understanding its evolution. No other author on this subject has outlined the
processes of state creation and regime building in specific Middle Eastern countries. Therefore,
I attempt to determine what social, economic, demographic, geographic, and international factors
have led to the state creation and regime building processes experienced by each of these
countries.
My next objective is to determine what factors have obstructed democratization in each
country. Again, no other author on this subject has linked an analysis of Middle Eastern states’
processes of state creation and regime building to an analysis of why none of the states’ regimes
has democratized.
My final objective is to posit a tentative overarching theory of state creation, regime
building, and obstacles to democratization across the three countries in this study. My intent is
to determine whether there were common factors that obstructed the development of democracy
across the three countries and if so, what conditions in each country resulted in these common
factors?
I have selected Jordan as my baseline case for it is the least nuanced. The cases of Saudi
Arabia and Iran then build upon the case of Jordan. My goal in this study is not to make
generalizations about the Middle East as a whole, rather it is to identify similarities and
differences between, and draw conclusions about, factors that are common across the three cases
presented. I hope that these conclusions could then be extrapolated and applied to other cases in
the region.
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I selected these countries because of the relationship and similarities among them. For example, Saudi Arabia and
Iran are regional rivals and Jordan and Saudi Arabia have some shared history. Furthermore, none has experienced
an “Arab Spring” even in recent years, and all have had extensive economic ties to foreign powers.
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METHODOLOGY

The first section consists of a review of existing literature on the processes of state creation,
regime building, and democratization. In this section, I define the state, the nation, and
democracy. I also present various theories of state creation, nation building, regime building,
and democratization. As I point out, most of the literature on these topics is Eurocentric, and
therefore only marginally applicable to the Middle East. The various theories that exist, and
which I present, that are specifically related to the Middle East are flawed in two major ways:
they present theories for the region of the Middle East as a whole, and they barely describe the
processes of state creation and regime building in the region. They also fail to derive theoretical
constructs that help to understand variances in such processes.
After I review the existing literature, I outline each country’s history. I divide each
history section into important events prior to the 20th century, but I focus principally on the 20th
century since this century was a turning point for all three countries. I begin with Jordan,
followed by Saudi Arabia, and finally Iran. After outlining the respective histories of the
countries, I conduct an analysis of their processes of state creation and regime building, as well
as examine why none has democratized. In the analysis of each case, I attempt to answer the
following questions:

•

What factors throughout history have shaped the country’s process of state creation?

•

What factors throughout history have shaped the country’s process of regime building?

•

Why has the country not democratized?
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•

What is the role/impact of foreign intervention in the processes of state creation and
regime building in the country?
o How has having a rentier economic system impacted the social and political
systems in the country?

•

Are there any indicators at present that the country in question could potentially
democratize?

•
In the final section, I develop a tentative overarching theory for the processes of state
creation, regime building, and democratization, or lack thereof across the three cases. As I
already noted, I use Jordan to build the base of my theoretical framework because it is the least
nuanced of the three cases. I then move onto Saudi Arabia and Iran to refine and restructure, if
necessary, my original theoretical construct. I end with some thoughts about areas for potential
future research.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The existing literature on state creation, regime building, and democratization tends to focus on
European actors. The literature on these subjects concerning the Middle East is limited and what
exists often examines the region as a whole, with little differentiation between various countries.
Additionally, the literature places the Middle Eastern experience in the context of European
theories of state creation, regime building, and democratization. Furthermore, the literature tends
to explain state creation and regime building in the Middle East in more of a historical, rather
than theoretical, context. Despite the Eurocentric nature of the seminal theories of state creation,
regime building, and democratization, they are necessary and important to examine, as they
provide general outlines of the aforementioned processes. After I outline the seminal works on
each of these processes, I outline the literature that exists on these processes in the Middle East
specifically.

Definitions of the State

The classic definition of the state is Max Weber’s. Weber defines the state as a “community that
successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given
territory”.1 While Weber’s definition is clear-cut, and presents the state as a legitimate,
functioning entity, Karl Marx takes a different view. Weber has confidence in the state; Marx
does not. Marx views the state as an illusion or confidence trick by those in power to maintain
their power. He believes that states are less cohesive and more chaotic entities than those in

5

power want people to believe. 2
Another seminal definition of the state is Charles Tilly’s. Like Weber, he claims that a
state exists if there is a defined territory, yet he also stipulates that the entity must be
differentiated from other organizations that exist within the same territory. The entity must also
be autonomous, and divisions of power within the entity must be formally coordinated with one
another.3 Like Weber, Tilly has more confidence in the state as a cohesive, functioning entity
than does Marx.
These three authors all focus their studies on the nature of European states. A less
Eurocentric definition of the state is Joel Migdal’s. He defines the state as “an organization
composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state’s leadership, its executive
authority, and that has the ability to make and implement binding rules for all people as well as
implement parameters of rule-making for other social organizations in a given territory, using
force if necessary to have its ways.” 4 Migdal does not define the state based on the experience
of European state-making, and therefore, his broader definition is more applicable to other statemaking experiences outside of Europe. However, like Weber’s classic definition, he does
acknowledge that there must be a defined territory and that force can be used to achieve state
goals.
Similar to Weber’s definition, Jorge Dominguez defines a state as “a set of institutions
with claim to a legitimate monopoly of force over a certain territory and an ability to exercise
it…”5 Dominguez argues, as others do, that a state has a monopoly of force over a certain
territory, yet he takes his definition one step further: he assumes that the state actually has the
power to assert its force over the territory. 6 Dominguez’s view of the state is inherently more
militant than other authors’ views.
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Joseph Strayer takes one of the strictest views of the state. Strayer defines the state as
having special fixity, durability, permanent and impersonal institutions, final authority and
loyalty.7 This is similar to Weber’s definition in that a state needs to be territorially defined; yet
Strayer stipulates very specific guidelines for the nature of institutions within the state. Like
Tilly, he argues that the state must be the entity that has ultimate authority within a territory.
Taking a drastically different view than Strayer, Jay Nordlinger defines the state as “all
those individuals who occupy offices that authorize them, and them alone, to make and apply
decisions that are binding upon any and all parts of a territorially circumscribed population. The
state is made up of, and limited to, those individuals who are endowed with society-wide
decision-making powers.”8 He assumes, as others do, that a state is defined in a specific
territorial area. However, his definition does not focus on the “exercising force” aspect of a
state, and he also defines the state as being comprised of those who are responsible for its
decision-making.9 In other words, Nordlinger views a state’s power as stemming from
individuals who are responsible for decision-making, as opposed to its power stemming from the
use of force.
Stephen Krasner is one of the few authors who includes sovereignty in his definition of
the contemporary state. Krasner outlines four definitions of sovereignty: 1) international
sovereignty, 2) Westphalian sovereignty, 3) domestic sovereignty, and 4) interdependence
sovereignty.10 The first definition defines a political entity in the international system and asks
“is the entity recognized by other states?”11 Recognition is extended to states with territorial and
formal juridical autonomy. 12 The second definition addresses political life, which is organized
on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority. 13
The third definition addresses the following questions: “How is public authority organized within
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the state?” and “How effectively is it exercised?”14 The fourth definition addresses the issue of
state sovereignty being eroded by the process of globalization. 15
Unlike the other authors discussed thus far, Gabriel Ardant views the state through an
economic lens. Ardent describes the state as a set of expansive goals pursued by rulers of the
state, a bundle of financial policies, economic infrastructure and resources, financial
consequences of state policies, and the social political consequences of these variables. 16 The
state, in his view, operates as a purely economic entity and focuses its activity almost solely on
the expansion of its economic goals.
I favor Joel Migdal’s definition of the state since it takes into account what comprises a
state, as opposed to simply defining the physicality of a state. Furthermore, in terms of state
functions, Migdal’s definition highlights the role that other institutions besides the military play
in the functioning of the state. Overall, I find Migdal’s definition to be the most comprehensive.

General Theories of State Creation

Because successful democratic regime building cannot take place outside the entity of an
established and legitimate state, I now turn to an examination of theories of state creation.
In his work on state formation in Europe, Stein Rokkan writes that there were four
dimensions of the generation of systems of territorial control in Europe as state formation took
place: 1) a territory’s distance North from Rome, 2) a territory’s geopolitical distance West or
East from the center belt of trade route cities, 3) the concentration of landholdings in a territory,
and 4) the ethnic basis of the early efforts of center building and linguistic conditions for early
versus late consolidation of the state. 17 Rokkan puts emphasis on the legacy left by the Roman
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empire in terms of law. 18 He argues that the empire left a precedent of literate bureaucracy and
legal institutions, trade and the emergence of new identities, the emergence of a national script,
and the ability to unify peripheries culturally and linguistically. 19
However, prior to the processes of state formation in Europe, there was a key process that
took place in its territories: consolidation of power initiated by a small group of elites and
accompanied by the eventual incorporation of peripheral populations into the core of their power.
The periphery became tied to the center through four organizing agencies: legal, military,
cultural, and economic.20 The nature of center-periphery integration can be classified by primary
indicators—estimates of comparative strength of the four organizing agencies setting conditions
for center-periphery integration—secondary indicators—two way linkages among the four
organizing agencies, i.e., the how the center was connected to the periphery through each
individual factor—and tertiary indicators—assessment of the overall strength of two poles of the
model; the two poles being economic strength and cultural distinctiveness.21
To differentiate the political systems that emerged out of the center-periphery links,
Rokkan identifies three factors: 1) characterization of peripheries based on their dependence on
the center; tied via military, culture, language and religion, 2) internal and external resources of
the central establishment and differences among elites in their abilities to marshal resources, and
3) similarities and differences in the process of change, i.e., which center-periphery links were
established first.22 The economic interaction between the center and periphery—urban and rural
populations—were important because the strongest European nation-states were built on
territories with a history of ownership and control of land. 23 Essentially, the balance of
integration between the center and periphery in terms of economics is an important factor in the
center-periphery links and success of integration in Europe.24
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Rokkan goes on to identify four stages of state creation in Europe. First, as previously
discussed, elites had to unify politically, economically, and culturally. This process allowed for
the establishment of the requisite infrastructure for state creation. Second, elites at the center had
to expand their networks to the peripheries to draw them into the new political system. Third,
increased channels of communication had to be established to enable mass participation in
political parties and opposition groups. Finally, agencies of redistribution had to emerge to meet
the demands of the larger population.25 Evolution through the four phases that Rokkan posits
becomes important in the context of the cases examined in this study since all of them have
achieved up to a certain phase, yet none has successfully completed phases three and four.
In the cases of European state formation, Rokkan identifies six givens: 1) the heritage of
the Roman legal system and concept of citizenship, 2) the organization of the Catholic Church
and its central role in channeling elite communication, 3) the role of the Germanic kingdoms, 4)
the revival of trade between the Orient, the Mediterranean and the North Sea after the defeat of
the Muslims in those regions, and the increase in the network of independent cities, 5)
development and consolidation of feudal and manorial agriculture systems and landholding, and
6) the emergence of literatures in vernacular languages and the decline of Latin as a universal
language.26
Overall, Rokkan identifies four master variables that were integral to state formation in
Europe: 1) secular religious differentiation, 2) linguistic unification/distinctiveness, 3)
differentiation between independence of city networks, and 4) concentration versus dispersal of
land holdings.27 Rokkan also discusses the role of the military as a tool for religious expansion.
Furthermore, he contends that the hierarchical structure of Catholicism was detrimental to later
development and democracy in Catholic countries, whereas Protestant countries did not
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experience these same challenges, and mass mobilization was easier.28 The roles of the military
and of religion have implications for the cases in this study.
Charles Tilly posits a theory of state formation compatible to that presented by Rokkan.
Tilly outlines the common conditions that were present in Europe at the beginning of the 16 th
century that aided with state- making. First, there was cultural homogeneity present in much of
the region arising from a single-family system, i.e., not a tribal system. Second, there was a
prevalent peasantry which was settled, i.e., not nomadic, and which became increasingly tied to
the core of power in the territory through a process of power centralization. Third, the
decentralized political structure was uniform throughout the region, incorporated deliberative
assemblies, and came about through resistance to expansion of state power. 29 Tilly observes that
state makers in Europe imposed their will over centuries of ruthless effort, meaning that there
was time for these systems to develop. 30 Tilly adds that there were three important features of
state-making in Europe: 1) the population and collective political life, 2) the government
organization and its exercise of control over the means of coercion within a population, and 3)
routinized relations between the government organization and the population. 31 Tilly takes
directly from Rokkan the three diverse forms of mass mobilization that occurred in Europe. One
was the state-church relationship and the Reformation leading to mass participation in national
politics. Another was the relative timing of participation and industrialization. The final form
was cultural and religious diversity of the population under the state. 32
Generally, Tilly strives to answer three questions when considering state- making: 1)
under what conditions do nation-states become the dominant organization in the area? 2) What
are the chief forms taken by nation-states and what causes them to appear? and 3) What
determines if a nation-state is strong, durable, effective, and responsive to its own population? 33
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He argues that an entity can only be considered a state if: 1) it is clearly distinguished from other
institutions in the same region, 2) it is autonomous, 3) it is centralized, 4) its divisions are in
formal coordination with each other. 34 Furthermore, the ability of territories in Europe to evolve
into states was determined primarily by whether they: 1) possessed extractible resources, 2) were
vulnerable to military conquest for an extended period of time, 3) had capable political leaders,
4) boasted a powerful and successful army, 5) ruled over a homogenous population, 6) enjoyed
unification and centralization at the elite level, and 7) were positioned advantageously in the
international arena. 35
Tilly also discusses how the structure of the nation-state differs from the alternative
systems. First, it is a controlled, well-defined territory, second, it is relatively centralized, third,
it is differentiated from other organizations, and fourth, it reinforced its claims through the
tendency to acquire a monopoly over the concentrated means of physical coercion. 36 In terms of
the conditions that helped European states with their processes of state creation, Tilly argues that
homogeneity helped divide up the European continent into mutually exclusive territories with
decentralized power. Additionally, the weakness of corporate structures and kinship supported a
process of growth through the manipulation of shifting coalitions. 37 According to Tilly, the most
successful cases of state building took place when the managers of political structures could cope
successfully with social change and when they could direct social change toward a set of
outcomes.38 Tilly observes that state makers encouraged homogeneity of the culture, language,
religion and education, and it was the homogeneous populations that were able to survive and
prosper.39 The consolidation of the state system constricted opposition for the building of new
states through war, and territorial expansion. The armies that were built up as part of state
building process were unlikely to ever actually fight in an international war, but resources were
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still devoted to them as a show of the state’s power. Tilly makes a final important point when he
observes that the process of European state building will never again be repeated, and therefore,
new states will need to find alternative models of state building. 40 Many of the factors that Tilly
outlines as being useful for state creation are applicable to the cases in this study either in that
they were present or were noticeably lacking. A few important ones to note are the presence of
natural resources, homogeneity of religion, the presence of strong kinship structures, and the
history of colonialism and imperialism. 41
Samuel Huntington addresses the role of force in state creation. He outlines the dynamic
between militias and state militaries, though his study is limited to the United States. He states
that in the US Constitution, there are two clauses that make full civilian control of the military
impossible. First, sanction is given to semi-military forces that can never be completely
subordinated to military discipline nor completely removed from political entanglement.
Second, sanction is given to a division of control over the militia between state and national
governments, which leads to conflicting interests in the federal system. 42 Huntington argues
that the creators of the US Constitution preferred militia forces to a regular army and
throughout the 19th century, militias remained outside the control of the federal government.43
What is important about Huntington’s analysis is that it makes clear that in the US, dual control
of the military became unfeasible; state militia forces had been subordinated by national forces
by the 20th century.44 Huntington’s analysis has implications for the cases in this study because
of the role that militaries played in the initial process of state creation and consolidation of
power.
Literature pertaining to processes of state building in Latin America has implications for
the region of the Middle East as well. Frank Safford outlines seven factors that were important
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to state building Latin American during the 19th century: 1) economic geography, topography,
resources, and level of economic integration, 2) political geography, including geographic and
transportation conditions affecting political integration, 3) relative economic and fiscal strength,
4) relative public acceptance of the political systems whether or not a constitution exists, 5) the
extent to which civilian authorities control the military, 6) the role of the Catholic Church, and 7)
the relative vulnerability of the evolving state to external pressure or attack. 45 Each of these
factors has an implication in the context of the cases in this study, particularly the role of religion
(but not of the Catholic Church), geography, the level of economic integration, and the extent to
which the military is civilian controlled.
Fernando López-Alves presents another argument regarding Latin America that is
pertinent to the Middle East. He argues that feudal characteristics and mode-of-production
arguments regarding state creation are not relevant in Latin America. He then presents several
hypotheses on what has been relevant to state building processes in Latin America. One was the
failure on the part of a rebellious upper class to coalesce against the central power, which
accelerated power centralization, another was when the landed gentry were defeated in their own
domains, the process of centralizing power took place faster, and a final one was the location in
which wars took place.46 These factors have fewer implications in the context of the cases in this
study than do the ones identified by Safford. State formation did not stem from a rebellious
upper class in the countries in this study, nor was there a landed gentry present in any of the
countries.
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State Creation in the Middle East

According to Roger Owen, the Middle East has faced some of the most challenging state
formation conditions. The fact that concepts of legitimacy, hegemony, and authority were
unique to the European experience meant that they did not often take hold elsewhere the way
they did in Europe.47 From the European perspective, Middle Eastern states were supposed to
possess the same structure and follow the same trajectory as Western ones. Furthermore, they
were supposed to have the same systems of taxation and war-making skills as Europe. 48 Yet, as
Owen observes, the failure of the Middle East to achieve these norms of statehood and state
building has led some to believe that the Middle East is incapable of achieving statehood in the
European sense.49 Furthermore, Owen observes that within the region of the Middle East, there
are conceptual differences between the state, regime, and government. For example, all three are
so closely linked in Gulf States that if one were to collapse, the rest would follow. 50 This reality
makes analysis of the legitimacy of the state challenging. 51 It is important to note that there exist
conceptual differences between the state, regime, and government in all regions, not just the
Middle East. However, Owen’s point is that in the Middle East there is less of a distinction
between the state, regime, and government. For example, in the US when there is an election of
a new president, the government changes, but the regime type, a democracy, remains the same,
and the state as a defined entity remains intact. However, in Saudi Arabia, for example, the
regime is the government and the state, and therefore none of them can remain if the other
collapses.
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Owen argues that state formation in much of the Middle East can be categorized into
three phases: the colonial state, the immediate post-independence state, 2 and the authoritarian
state.52 The defeat of the Ottoman Empire during World War I signaled the beginning of French
and British occupation in the region and the division of the region into new territories with the
aim of creating modern states. 53 Even in places where the French and British allowed more
autonomy, both powers were responsible for determining new state borders, implementing rulers,
determining the new form of government, and exploiting natural resources.54 Even in instances
in which the physical state was created without foreign intervention, as was the case in Saudi
Arabia and Iran, the leaders of the new state could not engage in a process of state creation and
power consolidation without the economic assistance of the French and British. Furthermore,
even entities that came into being organically were forced to recognize other boundaries that had
been established by the French and British.55 Besides establishing the physical outlines of states,
the French and British were also responsible for establishing government structures.56 The
French and British tended to favor a monarchical or an authoritarian regime type as they were
easier to maintain control over.57 Owen discusses two more important aspects of state building
in the Middle East: family rule and the importance of natural resources, namely oil, in creating a
rentier economic system. He argues that places where family rule has endured are places in
which the tribal nomadic element has a strong history. 58 I will discuss these two factors further
in the context of the cases themselves.
Finally, Owen highlights the importance of the role of the military in the Middle East.
He outlines three important relationships: 1) the army as a special type of organization, with its
2

These first two factors also apply to Latin America. All Latin American states have faced internal struggles as to
whether to create a state in which power was heavily centralized and Catholicism played a central role, or to create a
secular state with power distributed between various regions. This is a challenge that the United States never faced
in its process of state creation (Hybel, The Making of Flawed Democracies, chapter 1).
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own particular form of hierarchy, well defined boundaries, and professionalism, 2) the relation to
the international arena and the fact that most militaries were modeled on European ones, after
which time the relationship continued through the sale of military equipment to Middle Eastern
countries by Western countries, and finally 3) the relationship of the army to the state. The
relationship depends on the structure of society and economic conditions. 59 Leaders in Jordan,
for example, built up the military with heavy reliance on tribal elements. This action, in turn,
helped ensure the loyalty of the tribes to the monarchy.60
Delving deeper into the role of natural resources in shaping state formation, Terry Karl
writes about how Venezuela’s reliance on oil shaped its process of state building. In Venezuela,
resource-based industrialization deepened oil-led development in the country and defined its
economic policy. 61 Additionally, Venezuela’s external borrowing became the main strategy by
which its leaders coped with an internal fiscal crisis. 62 An important concept Karl brings up is
‘Dutch Disease’. “Dutch Disease” refers to when a country that bases its whole economy on one
lucrative resource, it often lets all other industries fall by the wayside. 63 Iran, notes Karl, is
another example of “Dutch Disease.” In Iran, “Dutch Disease” led to an economy characterized
by inflation and balance-of-payments deficits. 64 Economic growth and institutional development
occurred simultaneously and were initiated by the arrival of multinational oil companies. 65 The
fate of the Pahlavi regime, state building, and the oil industry were inextricably linked.66 Karl’s
analysis of the role of natural resources in state formation, and their role in creating links with
foreign powers, have implications in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Beverly Milton-Edwards argues that in the Middle East, state creation was an artificial
process initiated by foreign powers, namely the French and British. As a result, citizens felt little
loyalty towards the state entity.67 Milton-Edwards asks: “To what extent did colonization
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promote state formation in the region?” and “To what extent was the Western or European
inspired model rooted in the region?”68 Milton-Edwards posits three ways in which foreign
powers were involved in the Middle East, ranging from the least foreign involvement to the
most: mandates, protectorates, and colonies. 69 Institutions of the state and government that
evolved under Islamic rule were replaced with European forms of government based on
principles of freedom and democracy, but also on a practice of colonial rule. 70 Milton-Edwards
emphasizes that no single phenomenon can describe the experience of the region as a whole,71
but that the economic role of oil rents must be factored into the region. She outlines Hazem
Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani’s theory of rentierism. Like Owen, Beblawi and Luciani state
that rentier states do not derive income from taxation or internal sources, but instead rely on
revenue derived from external rents from possessing lucrative national resources. 72 The state has
a monopoly on rents and distributes benefits to citizens while receiving nothing in return.73 This
type of economic system is important for Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Furthermore, MiltonEdwards states that the predominant political regime found in the Middle East are monarchies,
one-party systems, imam-chief systems, or post-colonial systems.74
Simon Bromley views the beginning of modern state formation in the Middle East in
much the same way as other authors do: it originated during the decline of the Ottoman Empire
and subsequent European intervention.75 He argues that there were indicators of state formation
present in the Ottoman Empire, such as the tanzimat system,3 which originated in the mid 19th
century.76 The creation of modern nation states in the Western sense, however, actually started
with European domination of the economies in the region, the imposition of foreign currencies,
the imposition of administrative systems based on European legal codes, foreign control of
public revenue and expenditure, and direct foreign occupation and control of commerce and
3

See the “useful terms” section or the Jordan case study chapter for a definition.
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finance.77 Bromley concludes that there are three important factors to consider when examining
state creation in the Middle East: 1) the account of state formation must relate the development
of the state apparatus to the change in the nature of social relations which govern material
reproduction, 2) the pattern of state formation is shaped by the position of the state in the world
market/state system and the indigenous response, and 3) if state formation is to be viewed
through a historical lens, then it is important to pay attention to the social forces which struggled
to reproduce and transcend relations of appropriation and command. 78

General Theories of Nation Building

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan make an important distinction, one that I also want to make,
between ‘the nation’ and ‘the state’. Linz and Stepan argue that the nation is more conceptual
than the state; it is a “sphere of values.”79 The nation has no organizational characteristics
comparable to those of the state, i.e., no autonomy, agents, or rule, and the only resources of a
nation are derived from the psychological identity of people. 80 In the following, I outline what
various authors have written about ‘the nation’ as defined separately from ‘the state’.
Rokkan argues that nation building followed, or occurred along with, state building. He
outlines a number of factors necessary for nation building. He makes an important distinction
between the nation building that took place in the early European states, such as France, and
nation building that took place in later states, such as Germany. He identifies a few important
factors for nation building: coping with administration unification, addressing issues of national
identity building, and roping in territories that were accustomed to high levels of autonomy and
thus resisted state centralization of power.81 Rokkan also identifies the Protestant Reformation
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as a key factor in the transition from state building (phase one) to nation building (phase two)
and the development of unified cultures before the era of mass politics (phases three and four). 82
He states that nation building in Europe also depended on the initial conditions of linguistic and
ethnic unification. Different European states had different linguistic developments, and therefore
different processes of power consolidation, unification, and center-periphery linkage.83
Linz and Stepan contend that state building generated nation building, and eventually a
process of democratization, in Europe.84 State building in Europe was accelerated by the crisis
of feudalism and the Renaissance and Reformation. 85 The authors aim to determine under what
conditions state policies aimed at nation building and state policies aimed at democratization
were congruent. They claim that it is only when there is an awakened or existing nation, no
irredenta outside state borders, and low cultural diversity that the aforementioned is the case.86

Nation Building in the Middle East

Owen argues that the Middle East has had a challenging time with the concept of the nation. He
argues that the nation, which in his view is a constructed entity, often came into being in Middle
Eastern states at the same time that state formation was taking place. 87 A new regime’s attempts
to control this process and establish a national identity through the use of passports, taxation, etc.
often faced obstacles in the form of existing identities, such as tribal ones. 88
Milton-Edwards also discusses the concept of the nation in the context of the Middle
East, and considers the views of a few other scholars. She points out that Elie Kedourie believes
that the nation in Middle Eastern states is often linked to political Islam,89 and that John
Hutchinson and Anthony Smith disagree with Kedourie’s view of nationalism, claiming that he
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makes out nationalism to be too much of a destructive force. 90 She then adds that Ernest Gellner
believes that nationalism is a modern concept that arose after the Western Industrial Revolution,
and that culture and language are important signifiers of national identity in the 20 th century.91
She also points out that according to Smith, the preexisting ethnic bonds are an explanatory
phenomenon in nationalism. 92 She concludes by contending that Benedict Anderson explores
the psychological appeal of nationalism, stating that the nation is an imagined product due to the
decline of other bonding elements, such as religion.93
Though the aforementioned concepts of the nation and nationalism vary to a certain
degree, Milton-Edwards observes that they all take a Eurocentric view of ‘the nation’.94 MiltonEdwards attempts to ameliorate this shortcoming by discussing two ways the nation in the
Middle East could be conceptualized: one is to view it from a Western model standpoint, the
other is to view it as more indigenous -- as something that draws upon the concept of the
umma—the community of Muslims—the tribe, or ethnic affiliation. 95 She argues that in the
historical context of the Middle East, the nation has been associated with: 1) the state, anticolonial sentiment, yet dependent on Western notions of state, class and ideology, and is often
imposed top-down, 2) post-colonial, anti-Zionist, and social liberation oriented movements of
state elites, and 3) theocracy-based and pan-Islamic notions of the state, which is the product of
an uneasy marriage between Islam and the West at the beginning of the 20 th century.96 She adds
that two unifying forces that transcend the state, which have been present in the Middle East
since the turn of the 20th century, are Arab nationalism and pan-Islamism.97
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General Theories of Regime Building and Democratization

Turning to an examination of theory on regime building and the process of democratization, I
first examine Robert Dahl’s seminal work on this topic. Dahl writes that there are two key
factors for determining regime type: political participation—how inclusive the political system
is—and political contestation—the level of political liberalization4 within the political system. 98
A strong presence of both these factors is integral to democratization and are the two most
important determinants of whether or not a regime is democratic. 99 Dahl states that there are
four extreme regime types: a closed hegemony in which neither participation nor contestation
exists, a competitive oligarchy in which there is full contestation but no participation, an
inclusive hegemony in which there is full participation but no contestation, and a polyarchy in
which there is full participation and contestation (see Figure 1).100 In reality, most regimes fall
somewhere in between these extremes, with varying levels of participation and contestation.

When I refer to ‘political liberalization’ in subsequent sections of this study, I am not using it synonymously with
‘contestation’. Rather, I am referring to a process of moving closer to the polyarchy quadrant of Dahl’s chart; a
process of the opening of the political system. In other words, I am referring to a process of democratization that
includes increases in both political participation and contestation, not just changes in contestation.
4
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Dahl discusses three paths for moving from a closed hegemony to the three other regime
types: from a closed hegemony to a competitive oligarchy, the level of contestation allowed—
political parties, organizations, etc.—increases, but participation remains nil; from a closed
hegemony to an inclusive one, the amount of participation allowed increases—a greater number
of people are allowed to have a role in political processes—but contestation remains nil; from a
closed hegemony to a polyarchy, both contestation and participation need to increase
significantly.101 The conditions presented by Dahl as being important for polyarchy have
important implications in the context of the cases in this study.
Linz and Stepan also discuss regime type and democratization, specifically focusing on
what it means for a regime to be a consolidated democracy. They argue that a democracy can be
consolidated in three ways: 1) behaviorally, i.e., when a regime is territorially consolidated,
when no significant national, social, political, or institutional actors spend resources to create a
non-democratic regime or turn to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state, 2)
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attitudinally, i.e., when a strong majority of the public believes that democratic procedures and
institutions are the best way to govern collective life as a society, and 3) constitutionally, i.e.,
when governmental and non-governmental forces in a territory of the state become subjected to,
or used to, the resolution of conflict within specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned
by the democratic process. 102 The authors also observe that a defined state must be present
before the process of creating a democratic regime can occur. If a state exists, then five other
conditions must also exist for the process of democratic consolidation to be successful: 1) a civil
society must exist, 2) there must be an autonomous, valued political society, 3) the rule of law to
ensure citizens’ freedoms and independent associational life must be present, 4) the state
bureaucracy is useable by the new government, and finally, 5) there exists and institutionalized
economic society. 103 Linz and Stepan pose the questions “Under what conditions do nationstates and democracy form complementary logics? Conflicting logics?” and “What makes
democracy consolidation more or less likely?” 104 The response the authors provide to these
questions is that nationalizing state policies can occur without democratic policy logic, or the
desire for it.105 A key variable in democratic theory is the degree to which people in a territory
accept the scope and domain of the state as the entity responsible for legitimate decisionmaking.106 Furthermore, Linz and Stepan include three key observations about democracy: 1)
democracy is harder when there exists a heterogeneous population, 2) to make democracy work
in multicultural places, the norms, practices and institutions of democracy must be carefully
crafted, and 3) the fact simply exists that some ways of dealing with stateness are inherently nondemocratic.107 In the context of the Middle East, Linz and Stepan ask an important question:
“How can democracy be achieved in multinational states?” If people feel foreign to the territory
in which they exist, and are denied citizenship, then democratic consolidation is unlikely, and
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can only be remedied if all citizens are given a common “roof” of individual rights. 108 They
argue that in the context of the Middle East, the concept of the ‘state-nation’ as opposed to the
‘nation-state’ is a better way to define the experience of the region. The state-nation is a
multicultural and national, but still engenders strong identity and loyalty from citizens; an
example of this would be the United States. 109
Linz and Stepan also outline three regime types that are applicable to the Middle East.
The first regime type is a totalitarian regime in which social, political, and economic pluralism
do not exist, there is a unified, articulated ideology, intensive and extensive mobilization of the
population, and leadership that rules charismatically with undefined limits. 110 Another regime
type is a post-totalitarian regime, which encompasses a range of regime types, but is different
from authoritarian regimes in that there is less economic and social pluralism than in
authoritarian regimes.111 In both aforementioned regime types, there is limited political
pluralism.112 The final regime type is a democracy, of which there are two subtypes:
consociational—ones in which coalition building occurs amongst non-majority segments, and
majoritarian—ones in which those who hold a majority of the vote gain power.113 Within the
post-totalitarian (non-democratic) context, there are many types of regimes, including
hierarchical military regime, non-hierarchical military regimes, sultanistic regimes based on
personalized rule, and civilian led regimes. 114
Linz and Stepan identify two paths of democratic transition: 1) through the rising up of
civil society and a collapse of a non-democratic regime, through revolution, or through a nonhierarchical military led coup, and 2) a transition initiated by a hierarchical state or regime, after
which there is no guarantee of an interim government.115 Like Dahl, Linz and Stepan view free
and fair elections as being crucial to democracy. 116 Elections also allow new political actors to
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emerge and are necessary for building up the proper institutions for democracy such as
legislatures, constitutional assemblies, competitive political parties. 117 Finally, Linz and Stepan
argue that the constitution-making environment is a too-often neglected aspect of democratic
transition and consolidation. They outline six contexts for constitution-making: 1) the retention
of the constitution created by a non-democratic regime, 2) the retention of a paper constitution
that becomes destabilized when used under more electorally competitive conditions, 3) the
creation by a provisional government of a constitution with some de jure non-democratic
powers, 4) the use of a constitution created under highly constraining circumstances reflecting de
facto power of non-democratic institutions and forces, 5) the restoration of a previous democratic
constitution, and 6) the process of free and consensual constitution-making among
democratically elected representatives. 118 The authors’ analysis about forms of democratic
transition has more implications for the cases in this study than does their analysis on
constitution-making.
Rokkan briefly comments on the transition to democracy that can occur after state
formation and power consolidation have occurred. He argues that once borders have been
consolidated, successful power consolidation often leads to less a desire on the part of the newly
incorporated population to leave, but at the same time, leads to an increased demand for a voice
in the new state entity. He argues that in Europe, if there were close economic ties between
urban elites and the rural populations, then there was a greater chance for a successful transition
to a full-suffrage competitive democracy. 119 Rokkan also argues that the geographical size and
location of the state have implications for democracy, as do class structure, tax burdens, ease of
resource extraction, and geopolitical issues. 120 Rokkan notes that in Europe, smooth transitions
to mass politics in phases three and four occurred when either the territory was remote from the
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trade belt so that a unique cultural and identity could develop, or the territory was within the
central belt and could establish consociational ties toward a central state apparatus. 121 Obstacles
to the transition to mass politics occurred when there was a strong central build-up at the edge of
the trade belt, or when power consolidation and nation building were followed too closely by a
transition to mass politics. 122 Rokkan notes that low levels of political mobilization of the
population at the time of state building is key for the successful development of mass politics
later on. In other words, it is necessary to consolidate state power and work out issues in the
state building process before the general population gains greater participation and
contestation.123 Rokkan’s phases have important implications for the cases in this study since
none has transitioned to phases three or four.
Charles Tilly raises three important issues vis-à-vis the study of regime type and
democratization. He first argues that in terms of political standing, the population needs to know
what regime type it is dealing with. The population must realize that democracies behave
differently from other political regimes in how they respond to external interventions [on
sovereignty], deal with international relations, and fight wars.124 Second, Tilly states that
democracy is good because it gives a regime’s population collective power and rescues people
from the tyranny and mayhem that prevails in most political regimes. 125 Democracy delivers
better living conditions in terms of education, medical care, and legal protection. Finally, Tilly
argues that democratization only occurs under rare social conditions, but when it does, it greatly
affects the citizens of a regime. 126
Tilly outlines three conditions necessary for democratization. First, there must be a
unitary state. Second, everyone within the territory must be allowed citizenship. Third, there
must be state activities such as elections and tax collection.127 Tilly then identifies four partly
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independent dimensions of variation among regimes, so as to be able to distinguish regime type
and to test for democracy: 1) breadth—has suffrage been extended to a whole state’s adult voting
age population, 2) equality—do all citizens, regardless of distinguishing characteristics, have
equal rights, 3) protection—are a state’s citizens protected from arbitrary action by the state, and
4) mutually binding consultation—do states have the clear and enforceable obligation to deliver
certain things to its citizens. Together, these four variables qualify as a single variable: the
degree of democracy present in a state. If a regime is moving toward the higher end of each of
these categories, this signals democratization. 128
Tilly brings up another important aspect of democracy: a state’s capacity to enforce its
political decisions. It is possible to have a high capacity for enforcement and to be
undemocratic, or to have a low capacity for enforcement and be democratic. The extremes are
low capacity and undemocratic, and high capacity and democratic. 129 A high-capacity
undemocratic regime is characterized by little public voice permitted by the state, high
involvement by the security forces, and regime change that occurs either through top-down
methods or mass rebellion. A low-capacity undemocratic regime is characterized by warlords,
ethnic blocks, religions mobilization, and frequent civil wars. A high-capacity democratic
regime is characterized by frequent social movements, political party mobilization, and high
political activity. A low-capacity democratic regime is characterized by frequent social
movements, interest group activity, and political party mobilization, but less effective state
monitoring.130
Juan Linz offers important insight into two regime types relevant to the Middle East:
totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Linz argues that a totalitarian regime includes three
characteristics: 1) there is a monistic, but not monolithic center of power, and any pluralism that
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exists derives its legitimacy from that center, is controlled by the center, and is a political
creation rather than a movement from a preexisting society, 2) there is an exclusive, autonomous,
and intellectually elaborate ideology used by ruling groups as a basis for policies or to
manipulate and legitimize their power, and 3) citizen participation in mobilization for political
and collective social action is encouraged and channeled through a single party and many
monopolistic secondary groups.131 Linz stresses the importance of ideology in legitimizing
totalitarian systems and rule. 132 Linz also outlines types of personal rule, such as traditional and
semi-traditional authority. An example would be tribal rule, which is especially relevant in the
cases of Jordan and Saudi Arabia.133 Another form of personal rule that Linz discusses is
sultanistic rule, which is based on personal leadership. Unlike traditional or semi-traditional
rule, it is not based on tradition or ideology, but on fear, rewards, and payouts to those who are
loyal.134 Another form of personal, which is often relevant in Latin American cases, is chieftain
politics. This regime type includes: 1) the repeated emergence of armed patron-client seats,
cemented on personal ties, 2) the lack of institutionalized means for succession to offices, 3) the
use of violence in political competition, and 4) the repeated failures of incumbent leaders to
guarantee their tenures. 135 Finally, Linz outlines authoritarian regimes. He states that an
authoritarian regime is one with limited political pluralism, without an elaborate guiding
ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, a lack of extensive or intensive political mobilization
except at certain developmental points, and a regime in which a leader exercises power within
ill-defined limits but some predictable ones. 136 Linz’s analysis of authoritarian regimes has
implications for the cases in this study.
Larry Diamond et al. discuss the impact of authoritarian regime structures on democracy
in Latin America. The authors believe that democracy is threatened both by the absence of an
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authoritative state and by an overly dominant one. 137 Though they were writing about Latin
America, their argument has implications for cases in the Middle East. States in the Middle East
often possess authoritarian regime types or have possessed them at some point in their respective
histories. Therefore, Diamond et al.’s analysis has important implications for the cases presented
in this study.
Having outlined existing literature on state creation, regime building, and
democratization, I now turn to an examination of the history of each respective country presented
in this study. At the end of each historical outline, I present an analysis of the factors in their
respective histories that have shaped each country’s processes of state creation, regime building,
and democratization. I begin with the case of Jordan.
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CHAPTER I
Jordan and its Unique Position in the Region

Introduction

Jordan holds a unique position in the Middle East. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the
end of World War I, Western powers carved up the territory and created the modern borders of
Jordan. Since its creation as a state, Jordan has prospered, remained stable, and played an
integral role as a regional mediator and ally of the British and Americans. Though it has faced
moments of instability, the original monarchy regime structure has endured. The case of Jordan
raises a number of important questions: How has Jordan arrived at its current position as a
regional mediator, maintained domestic stability, and managed to remain the beneficiary of
significant amounts of foreign economic aid despite lacking natural resources? And why,
despite its stability, has Jordan not yet democratized?
I first provide a brief overview of Jordan’s history. Then, I present original analysis of
how Jordan’s history has shaped its processes of state creation and regime building, as well as
why it has not democratized. I argue that the main issues to consider when examining Jordan’s
processes of state creation and regime building are the deeply-entrenched tribal structure, foreign
creation of the state borders, Jordan’s rentier economic system despite lacking lucrative natural
resources, and the political impact of a rentier economic system combined with a monarchical
regime.
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Geography and Early History

The region of modern-day Jordan is an area composed of several distinct sections that run north
to south.138 The territory has both mountains and deserts within a relatively small area. The
Jordan River, which is the main source of water for the country, runs west to east. Perhaps one
of the most infamous bodies of water, the Dead Sea, is located half in Jordan, and half in
Israel.139 Present-day Jordan was historically the location of stopping points on major trade
routes between Europe and East Asia, as well as on the Hajj, the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca,
though the region itself was never a destination point.140
The first notable people in the region were the Nabateans, who were responsible for
carving the famous landmark of Petra; their capital in the 4th century BC.141 During the
Byzantine period, which lasted from 330 to 1453 AD, the inhabitants of the region built
numerous churches and monasteries. In the last century of Byzantine rule, Arab influence rose,
with Arabs eventually controlling the region, spreading their language and, most importantly,
spreading the new religion of Islam. 142 Throughout the region’s history, tribes have been the
main social structure, and have played a key role in economic, political, and social aspects of
life.143
It is impossible to discuss the region of modern-day Jordan without an examination of its
connection to Islam. Islam originated in Mecca, which is located in the western Hejaz region of
the Arabian Peninsula, in the early 7th century AD. After its birth, Islam quickly spread to other
regions. The Prophet Mohammad, the founder of Islam, aspired to establish an umma, or a
widespread community, based on Islam. 144 By 651 AD, Arab Muslim forces had conquered the
area of modern-day Jordan, extending the governing body, the caliphate, into the region.145
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During the next decade, four major caliphs, the leaders of the caliphate, held power: Abu Bakr,
Oman, Othman, and Ali.146 After Ali was killed in 661 AD, the Umayyads seized power, and
established Damascus, located in modern-day Syria, as the capital of the caliphate.147 The
Umayyad dynasty lasted for almost 100 years. 148 In 750 AD, the Abbasids, a group originating
in Persia, took power. After overthrowing the Umayyads, the Abbasids moved the capital of the
caliphate to Baghdad, located in modern-day Iraq.149 Although the Abbasids continued to rule
from Baghdad through the 13th century, their power grew limited and weak. While allowing the
Abbasid caliph to maintain a figurehead position in Baghdad, the Fatimids and Ismaili Shiites
ruled the region respectively until 1070 AD.150 In 1086 AD, the Seljuk Turks swept into the
region from East Asia and took power. 151 The Crusaders, who arrived from Europe in 1089 AD
and captured Jerusalem in 1099 AD, soon challenged the Seljuks’ power. The Crusades
threatened Muslim pilgrims’ Hajj route to the holy city of Mecca. 152

The Ottomans

For most of the region’s history, tribes were resistant to the attempts at power consolidation of
any group that came to control the region. 153 Tribal resistance weakened each governing body,
thus enabling tribes to remain fairly autonomous. However, the Ottoman Turks were able to
incorporate tribes into their empire more successfully than any previous power. Beginning in
1516, the Ottomans worked to forcefully consolidated their power by ousting smaller regional
powers.154 For ease of governance, the Ottomans divided up the region into vilayets, or
governorships.155 However, the vilayet system failed to cement a uniform administration in the
Arab regions of the empire because of their great distance from the center of Ottoman power. 156
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The failure of the vilayet system meant that tribes retained a high degree of autonomy from the
central Ottoman government. 157 Despite this setback, by the mid 19th century the Ottomans had
managed to establish stronger ties with the tribal periphery and to marginally consolidate their
power.158 One way they did so was by implementing the tanzimat reforms. The tanzimat
reforms established a more centralized bureaucracy and a more sophisticated system of
provincial governorships.159 These changes disappeared with the fall of the Ottoman Empire at
the end of World War I.

World War I and the Creation of Transjordan

World War I was a watershed moment for the region. In 1916, in the midst of the war, the
British elicited the help of Sharif Hussein, the provincial ruler of Mecca and Medina, to launch a
revolt against the Ottomans, who had allied with the Germans. 160 In return, the British promised
Sharif Hussein an independent Arab state in the peninsula. 161 However, when the war ended
with an Allied victory, and the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the British failed to deliver on their
promise of a state. Instead, the British, along with the French, assumed control of the former
Ottoman territory. 162 The French and British quickly carved up their newly acquired territory.
The French took what would become Syria and Lebanon, and the British took what would
become Transjordan, later Jordan, and Iraq. 163 They also carved out a territory for a Jewish
homeland, which the British had promised to diaspora Zionist movements in US and Europe.164
To marginally compensate Sharif Hussein, the British agreed to make his three sons, Faisal,
Abdullah, and Ali, the leaders of three newly created mandates. The three sons were given
Syria, Transjordan, and Iraq respectively. 165
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For his part, Abdullah viewed Transjordan as merely an extension of the Hijaz where his
father had been in power. 166 As part of the Hashemite family, which claimed direct heritage
from the Prophet Mohammad, Abdullah saw his rule of Transjordan as a continuation of his
rightful power as a Hashemite. 167 Transjordan’s similar topography and tribal social structure to
those found in the Hijaz, enabled Abdullah to easily assume governance of the territory under the
supervision of the British.168 Many tribal factions rallied around Abdullah. 169 In March 1921,
Abdullah and his military force, comprised mostly of Bedouin tribe members, reached Amman,
an old center of power under the Ottomans.170 A month later, the British and Abdullah had
organized a government with an advising body called the “council of consultants” and later the
“central authority.” Ultimate power, however, resided with Abdullah as emir.171 The British
also continued to play a major role in the region, namely by providing economic subsidies.172
Collaboration between Abdullah’s central authority and local tribal leaders helped to increase
core-periphery ties, and to connect distant rural areas to the central of power in Amman. 173 In
addition, tribal institutions of a system of tax collection, a justice/law system, 174 and a system of
commerce formed the basis of important institutions in Transjordanian society. 175
The period between 1921 and 1946 was a time of great political change in
Transjordan.176 On May 15, 1923, Britain, aware that Transjordan had attained stability,
recognized it as as a nation-state. Britain marginally lessened its presence in the country, but
continued to support it with economic subsidies.177 The external economic aid transformed
Transjordan’s economy into a rentier economic system, but one that was based on the purchasing
of a natural resource. Rather, the British recognized Abdullah as a stable regional ally, and were
willing to provide economic aid to maintain this stability. 178
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Perhaps the most influential development of this time period occurred on February 20,
1928, when the British and Abdullah established the Anglo-Transjordan Agreement. 179 This
agreement recognized Transjordan as an independent territory and no longer simply as a British
mandate.180 The treaty also established Organic Law, which formed the foundation for a later
constitution, and called for a representative body, as well as allowed for the creation of political
parties. 181 In reality, however, this agreement did little to diminish the power of British
advisors.182 Abdullah also continued to rely on Britain economic subsidies to support the state’s
economy.183

Independence

Just as the World War I was a turning point in the region, so too was World War II. In May
1946, soon after the end of the war, the British and Abdullah reached yet another agreement
called the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty. This treaty established the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
as an independent state with Abdullah as its king. 184 The British, who had suffered great losses
during World War II, began to reduce their presence in the country. A new rising power, the
United States, filled the void by becoming the main provider of economic aid to Jordan. 185 The
newly independent state of Jordan was soon tested as a regional actor during the Arab-Israeli war
of 1948.186 The creation of the Jewish state of Israel after World War II had angered its Arab
neighbors. During the 1948 conflict, Jordan assumed an important role by taking in Palestinians
who had been displaced.187 As a result of the conflict, the Jordanian regime assumed control of
the West Bank. In a unique decision, Jordan became the only Arab state to extend full
citizenship to Palestinians. 188
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Despite this act of inclusivity, not all Palestinians wanted to be Jordanian
citizens. Tensions increased between the Palestinian population and the Jordanian government.
In 1951, a disgruntled Palestinian who felt that the king had not done enough to protest Jewish
settlements, killed King Abdullah. 189 Abdullah’s son Talal succeeded him. Talal implemented
one of the most important political developments in Jordan’s history: the 1952 Constitution. The
1952 Constitution outlined the structure of the government system in the country. It defined an
executive branch, represented by the king. The king had the power to appoint the prime
minister, a council of ministers, 190 judges, twelve regional governors, and the mayor of
Amman.191 In terms of parliament itself, the king had the power to appoint members of the
Upper House of parliament called the Senate, or House of Notables, while the lower house, the
Chamber of Deputies, was to be elected by the people.192 The king could also veto anything
passed in parliament. 193 At that time women could not vote. 194 The 1952 Constitution is still
used today, though it has been amended. Soon after establishing the constitution, Talal was
forced to abdicate due to health reasons. On May 2, 1953, when Talal’s son Hussein turned
eighteen, he assumed the role of king in a smooth transition of power.195
The political system continued to evolve under Hussein. During the early 1950s, the
number of political parties increased. 196 In October 1954, there were parliamentary elections, but
Hussein, citing a lack of freeness and fairness, dissolved the elected parliament and called for
new elections scheduled for 1956. 197 The decision diminished political activity. 198
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Domestic and Regional Instability

Significant challenges to Jordan’s stability arose in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By 1967,
Palestinian nationalist organizations, namely the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) had
begun to operate out of Jordan to launch attacks against Israel. 199 King Hussein became
increasingly unable to control the PLO. 200 He feared that the PLO’s repeated attacks against
Israel would cause Israel to retaliate against Jordan. 201 Hussein’s fears came true when Israel
attacked the West Bank on November 13, 1966, easily defeating the Jordanian military. 202
Syrian-Israeli tensions were also high, and in the spring of 1967, Israeli forces shot down a
Syrian aircraft near the Jordanian border, making conflict seem imminent. 203 On June 5, 1967,
Israeli forces launched an offensive attack against Syria, forcing Jordan and Egypt to come to
Syria’s aid.204 Even collectively, the Arab militaries were not powerful enough to defeat the
Israelis. At the conclusion of the war, Israel occupied the Golan Heights in Syria, the West Bank
in Jordan, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai in Egypt. 205 On November 22, 1967, the United Nations
passed Resolution 242, which called for a ceasefire, and brought the war officially to an
end. The goal of the resolution was “land for peace,” calling for the Israelis to withdraw from
Arab territory, but not specifying how much, or which pieces of, territory.206
Once again, as was the case after 1948, Jordan was forced to deal with an influx of
displaced Palestinians from the West Bank.207 Exacerbating an already unstable situation with
the Palestinian population, King Hussein further angered Palestinians when he decided to engage
in talks with Israel. In response to this decision, Palestinian fighters, the feyadeen, who were
linked to the PLO, increased their activity levels within the country. 208 As a reply to the
domestic instability generated in the aftermath of the 1967 war, King Hussein made an
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influential political decision: he imposed martial law in 1967, effectively shutting down
parliament, prohibiting political party activity, banning elections, and quelling any civil society
that had begun to develop. 209
Martial law did not halt all the PLO’s activities. Tensions between the PLO and the
Jordanian regime came to a head on June 9, 1970 when there was an attempted attack on the
king’s life.210 Then, on September 6, 1970, a group of feyadeen hijacked a commercial airline
flight and took hostages in an attempt to demonstrate how far the PLO was willing to go to
achieve autonomy in the West Bank. 211 Soon after, on September 16, 1970, a group of feyadeen
took over Irbid, a northern city in Jordan. 212 These events came to be known as Black
September.213 The US and Britain, whom King Hussein had asked for assistance in dealing with
the PLO, facilitated a conference between the Jordanian government and the PLO in Cairo on
September 24, 1970. On September 27, they established a ceasefire between the feyadeen and
the Jordanian forces. 214 By June 18, 1971, Jordanian forces had driven the feyadeen out the
country completely. 215 Though the threat to domestic stability created by the PLO had been
eliminated, the king maintained martial law, leaving no room for dissent or protest. 216 In the
aftermath of Black September, Jordan found itself isolated from other Arab states. These states
were angered not only by King Hussein’s actions against the PLO, but also by his desire for talks
with Israel.217
Despite animosity between Jordan and its Arab neighbors, they were forced to put aside
their differences when tensions with Israel once again flared up in 1973. Jordan helped Syria
and Egypt prepare for an offensive against Israel in an attempt to regain territory lost in
1967. King Hussein assisted with war preparations, but stressed that he wanted Jordan to remain
out of actual combat. 218 On October 5, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched an offensive against
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Israel on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. 219 United Nations Resolution 388, which called for
a ceasefire, negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, and a “just and durable peace in the
Middle East,” as well as upheld the stipulations of Resolution 242 in terms of land divisions,
helped bring the war to an end.220 The new resolution also returned governance of the West
Bank to the Jordanian regime.221 In 1978, US President Carter mediated the Camp David talks
in an attempt to facilitate peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. 222 Jordan ultimately
decided to reject the Camp David Accords, seeing them as a violation of Palestinian rights.223
Most other Arab states rejected them as well, except for Egypt, which became the first Arab state
to recognize Israel.224
In the 1980s, Jordan’s economy experienced a downturn. Many Jordanians began to call
for an end to martial law as a way to ameliorate the situation by giving the population a greater
political voice.225 King Hussein, however, believed that it would be difficult to hold elections
with the political status of the West Bank undecided. 226 In 1984, King Hussein went so far as to
prohibit elections unless the West Bank was included, thus rendering any possibility of elections
dependent on the status of the West Bank. 227
Instability in the West Bank caused King Hussein to think carefully about its status as
part of Jordan. In 1987, angered by the ongoing authority of the Jordanian government, the PLO
launched an intifada, i.e., an uprising. The Jordanian government ultimately suppressed the
uprising, but King Hussein decided to end Jordan’s governance of the West Bank on July 28,
1988, effectively turning it over to the PLO.228 Once Jordan no longer controlled the West Bank,
King Hussein had no further basis on which to prevent elections. In 1989, he ended the twentytwo-year period of martial law and allowed elections, political parties, and voting once
again.229 The first elections took place on November 8, 1989 and were widely considered to be
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free and fair. 230 In an attempt to maintain Jordan’s modern image in the eyes of the international
community, women, who had gained the right to vote in 1974, were allowed to vote and to run
for office in 1989.231 The political changes managed to appease the population and restore
stability within the country, but the economic situation did not improve much.

Modern-Day

The political changes of the late 1980s did not continue into the 1990s because the regime feared
that too much political liberalization would pose a challenge to its authority.232 Outside of the
domestic sphere, the First Gulf War launched by the US against Iraq challenged Jordan’s strong
relationship with the US. In 1991 when the US invaded Iraq in response to Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait,233 Jordan supported UN sanctions against Iraq, but expressed its disagreement with the
invasion.234 At the conclusion of the First Gulf War, Jordan was forced to contend with a
massive influx of Iraqi refugees, which added further stress to the country’s faltering
economy.235
In 1994, exacerbating an already tense situation in the country, King Hussein became the
second Arab state to sign a treaty recognizing Israel. 236 Five years later in 1999, King Hussein
passed away a respected leader. 237 Upon his passing, his second son, Abdullah, became King
Abdullah II in a smooth transition of power. 238 During his first few years as king, Abdullah II
was forced to address a number of challenging domestic and international issues, including
Jordan’s economy, the events of September 11th, 2001, a collapse of the Palestinian/Israeli peace
process, another Palestinian intifada in 2000, and the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 239 Under
Abdullah II’s leadership, Jordan continued to play a vital role in the region that went beyond the
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scope of its economic and military means. 240 After the events of 9/11, ties between Jordan and
the US grew stronger, and Jordan backed the US’s military campaign against the Taliban in
Afghanistan.241 This support led to an increase in US economic aid to the country. 242 The
second US war in Iraq in 2003 was less popular in Jordan. Many Jordanians were upset that the
regime allowed the US to use Jordan as a base of military operations against another Arab
state.243
Recently, King Abdullah II has worked to strengthen ties between Jordan and other
international powers, including the European Union, as well as with international economic
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO).244 He has also worked to strengthen Jordan’s relationship with Arab Gulf States and
Egypt.245 Throughout the course of his reign thus far, King Abdullah II’s main goal has been
economic improvement within the country, but the cost of this focus has been that political
liberalization has remained largely stagnant. 246 However, in 2013, he authorized the
establishment of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) to oversee elections; the freeness
and fairness of elections has increased since then. Despite this change, levels of political
participation remain low, as do levels of contestation.247 Additionally, civil society in Jordan
remains weak.248
I now turn to an analysis of state creation and regime building processes in Jordan and
posit arguments as to why Jordan has not democratized.
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ANALYSIS

Jordan did not exist as a state, or even as a defined territory, prior to the start of the 20th century.
The region was not a destination point; rather it was a throughway for trade and religious
pilgrims to Mecca and Medina. The region that is now Jordan was composed of nomadic tribes,
did not have a core elite group, or even a central city. The tanzimat reforms implemented by the
Ottomans in the 19th century helped to consolidate their power in the region somewhat, though
tribes continued to resist increased power consolidation. Thus, it can be proposed that before
that 20th century:

Hypothesis 1: The tribal structure of society and the transitory nature of the region up
until the 20th century prevented the emergence of a core elite group able to design a
power center. Their absence hindered the formation of an indigenous state.

Hypothesis 2: The tanzimat reforms implemented by the Ottoman Empire helped
Ottoman leadership to consolidate its power in the region.

However, the process also encountered a counterforce:

Hypothesis 2a: Tribal resistance to increased consolidation of Ottoman power
hindered the effective incorporation of the periphery into the Ottoman core.
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As I already explained, the 20th century marked a turning point for the region. The
collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the conclusion of World War I paved the way for state
creation in the region. The British and French carved up the territory into mandates under their
respective leaderships. The British had received help from the provincial ruler of Mecca, Sharif
Hussein, in rebelling against the Ottoman Empire. In return, the British had promised him a state
in the Arabian Peninsula. At the conclusion of the war, the British failed to keep their promise,
and instead granted Sharif Hussein’s three sons, Abdullah, Faisal, and Ali, power in the new
mandates of Transjordan, Syria, and Iraq respectively. Abdullah’s new government had an
insufficient tax base, and thus Transjordan was forced to rely on British economic subsidies for
economic revenue. Foreign economic subsidies created a rentier economic system in the
fledgling state. Given Transjordan’s early history, it can be proposed that:

Hypothesis 3: Upon defeating the Ottoman Empire, the Allied forces dismantled the
institutional framework that the former had built. The continued presence of the Allied
forces in the region hindered an indigenous state creation process.

Hypothesis 4: Foreign economic subsidies created a rentier economic system in
Transjordan. The rentier economic system, combined with a monarchical regime
structure, prevented the regime from being accountable to the population. The lack of
accountability hindered participation and contestation and precluded the creation of a
democratic regime.
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In 1923, the British and Abdullah negotiated a treaty that recognized Transjordan as a
nation-state that could someday become independent. The British, however, retained a
significant amount of power in the country and continued to provide economic support. During
the 1920s, Abdullah managed to reduce the number of cross-border raids between tribes in
Transjordan and the Hijaz region of what would become Saudi Arabia. He also managed to
marginally increase the government’s ability to collect taxes from the population. In 1928,
Abdullah and the British established another treaty that defined Transjordan as its own territory
and no longer simply a mandate. The 1928 treaty also created a legislative council, allowed for
political parties, and established Organic Law, which served as rudimentary constitution. Given
the developments in Transjordan during the 1920s, it can be proposed that:

Hypothesis 5: Decreased tribal raids in the 1920s helped to define the borders of the state
and to increase the incorporation of the tribal periphery into the power center. Both
measures aided the process of consolidating and legitimizing the power of the state.

Hypothesis 6: The creation of Organic Law, a legislative council, and the establishment
of the first political parties increased contestation. These developments marginally
increased political liberalization.

Transjordan gained full independence in 1946. Transjordan had been drawn into World
War II on the side of the Allies through its ties with Britain and at the conclusion of the war, the
two established another treaty. The treaty renamed the country the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan with Abdullah as its king. After the war, the British decreased their presence in the
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country but continued, along with the United States, to provide large quantities of economic aid.
Soon after gaining independence, Jordan took in a large number of displaced Palestinians as a
result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. The regime also assumed control of the West Bank and
became the first Arab country to extend full citizenship to Palestinians. Harboring Palestinians
resulted in domestic tension. Issues with Palestinian segments of population came to a head in
1951 when a disgruntled Palestinian assassinated King Abdullah. In 1952, Talal established the
constitution that is still used today. The constitution provided a foundation for increased
political participation and contestation, although women could still not vote. During the early
1950s, the number of political parties increased, but due to domestic instability and tension with
Palestinian segments of the population, Hussein dissolved parliament in 1954. In 1967, Jordan
was drawn into the conflict between Israel and Syria/Egypt. As a result of the war, Jordan lost
the West Bank, as well as Arab Jerusalem, and received another influx of Palestinians. Due to
the instability generated by the war, King Hussein declared martial law in 1967, dissolving
parliament, and banning political parties and elections. Soon after, King Hussein expressed a
desire to come to an understanding with Israel. This decision angered many in the PLO, namely
its political fighters, the feyadeen. The situation between the PLO and the Jordanian regime
became increasingly unstable, with events coming to a head in September of 1970. Eventually,
Jordanian forces were successful in expelling the PLO from the country, but King Hussein
maintained martial law. Given this part of Jordan’s history, it can be proposed that:
Hypothesis 7: The large presence of Palestinians in Jordan after 1948 engendered
political disunity and undercut the process of unifying the state.
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Hypothesis 8: The 1952 Constitution provided the foundation for increased political
participation and contestation. This development increased political liberalization.

Despite the aforementioned political development, another major event undercut increased
political liberalization:
Hypothesis 9: When King Hussein imposed martial law in 1967, he prohibited elections
and outlawed political party activity. This measure decreased political participation and
contestation, and therefore stymied political liberalization.

The domestic climate in Jordan calmed after the events of Black September in 1970, and
the subsequent ousting of the PLO. However, regional tensions remained high when Syria and
Egypt decided to launch an offensive against Israel on Yom Kippur in 1973 in an attempt to
regain lost territory from 1967. The war mostly resulted in a territorial stalemate, but Jordan
regained governance of the West Bank. A year later, in 1974, the regime granted women the
right to vote in order to maintain its international image as a modern state. More political
changes followed in the 1980s as Jordan’s economy deteriorated and the regime searched for
ways to appease the population and maintain stability. In 1988, King Hussein announced that
Jordan would be turning over governance of the West Bank to the PLO, a measure that reduced
pressure on the Jordanian government to try to effectively govern the West Bank. Finally, in
1989, King Hussein ended martial law, reinstated elections and voting, and allowed political
parties to operate once again. King Hussein hoped that these measures would reduce the
instability generated by deteriorating economic conditions. The 1989 election was generally
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considered free and fair, and the election successfully established a representative lower house of
parliament. Given this part of Jordan’s history, it can be proposed that:

Hypothesis 10: Women gained the right to vote in 1974. This measure increased political
participation and consequently the level of political liberalization.

Hypothesis 11: The end of martial law in 1989 and the restoration of
elections, political parties, and voting increased political participation
and contestation. These measures further increased the level of political
liberalization.

The political liberalization initiated by King Hussein 1989 did not last into the 1990s.
Jordan remained reliant on the US for economic subsidies, which placed the former in a
precarious position during the First Gulf War, when the US invaded Iraq. Jordan was forced to
support the invasion due to its need for economic subsidies from the US, though politically, it
opposed the invasion. The war created an influx of Iraqi refugees into Jordan, putting additional
economic pressure on the country. In 1994, Jordan became the second Arab state, besides Egypt,
to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Soon after establishing this treaty, and after ruling for almost
fifty years, King Hussein passed away in 1999. His second son, Abdullah II, assumed power.
King Abdullah II’s main focus has been on the economy, as well as on Jordan’s international
position. Ties between Jordan and the US grew stronger after the events of September 11, 2001
when King Abdullah II pledged to help the US fight terrorism. A trend in recent political
elections has been a high degree of freeness and fairness, particularly since the creation of the
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IEC. Participation in Jordan’s political processes, however, remains low. The country also
continues to rely heavily on economic subsidies from the US. Additionally, civil society in the
country remains weak. Given Jordan’s recent history, it can be proposed that:

Hypothesis 12: The creation of the IEC in 2013 helped to ensure free and fair elections.
This measure increased the level of political liberalization.

Undercutting the significance of the aforementioned development is the following:

Hypothesis 13: Jordan’s ongoing rentier economic system, combined with a monarchical
regime structure, prevents the regime from being accountable to the population. This
lack of accountability prevents full participation and contestation, which in turn obstructs
political liberalization.

Conclusion

The monarchical regime structure in Jordan remains strong. The regime appears to initiate
increases in levels of political participation and contestation in response to popular pressure in
times of economic downturns. However, there is also precedent of social unrest leading to
decreased levels of political participation and contestation, as was the case in 1967. How the
regime will respond in the future to ongoing regional instability and a faltering domestic
economy remains to be seen. In addition, civil society remains weak and the royal family
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remains unchallenged. It will be crucial to monitor the social, economic, and political conditions
of the country moving forward to see if there are any conditions present for regime change or
further political liberalization.
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CHAPTER II
Saudi Arabia and its Regional Hegemony

Introduction

Saudi Arabia presents a slightly more complex case than that of Jordan. Unlike Jordan, Saudi
Arabia possesses copious amount of a vital natural resource, oil. Due to Western extensive
purchases of oil, Saudi Arabia has a rentier economic system in the traditional sense. Rents from
Western oil purchases have made Saudi Arabia a powerful regional actor, a position augmented
by its status as the protector of Mecca and Medina, the two holiest cities in Islam. Though
foreign powers did not set the borders of the state as they did in the case of Jordan, Western oil
purchases contributed significantly to the fast pace at which Saudi Arabia’s state power was
consolidated. The regime of Saudi Arabia continues to be a monarchy comprised of family
members of the founder of the state, Ibn Saud, and remains inextricably linked to the strict
Wahhabi branch of Islam. The conservative-modern paradox that has been present throughout
Saudi Arabia’s history raises a number of questions: To what extent has Wahhabism influenced
Saudi Arabia’s processes of state creation and regime building? Are there any indications that
social and economic liberalization, particularly in recent years, could translate into political
changes?
As in the previous case, I first provide a brief overview of Saudi Arabia’s history. Then,
I offer original analysis Saudi Arabia’s state creation and regime building processes, as well as
why it has not democratized. I argue that the main issues to consider when examining the
processes of state creation and regime building in Saudi Arabia are the prevalent tribal structure
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of society, the use of religion to legitimize the regime’s power, and foreign purchases of oil
creating a rentier economic system.

Geography and Early History

The modern-day state of Saudi Arabia occupies most of the Arabian Peninsula. The peninsula is
a plateau made up of desert with limited water. 249 For most of the region’s history, the
predominant social structure has been a nomadic tribal system. 250 The main tribal factions were
Bedouin tribes who lived a nomadic, or semi-nomadic, lifestyle.251 During Ottoman times, the
great distance of the peninsula from the center of Ottoman power resulted in a high degree of
autonomy for the tribal populations. Society in the peninsula has always been extremely
homogenous, both ethnically and religiously. 252
It is impossible to separate the history of the region from the development of Islam. The
rise of Islam, which I discussed in the previous chapter on Jordan, cemented the regions status as
a destination point. By the 10th century, Islam had spread far beyond the points of origin in
Mecca and Medina, and the caliphate had begun to fracture; its sheer size making governance
challenging. The Hashemite tribe, who claimed direct descent from the Prophet, gained power in
Mecca and Medina from the 10th century until World War I. 253 Only in 1517, thirty-four years
after the Ottoman Empire had begun to consolidate its power in the present-day Middle East, did
the Hashemites accept marginal Ottoman control in the Hejaz. Despite this, the Hashemites
retained a fair amount of autonomy given the Hejaz’s distance from the center of Ottoman power
in Constantinople. 254
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The Al Saud Tribe

The Hashemites had no control in the eastern part of the peninsula. In 1744, the Al Saud tribe,
originating in the eastern Nejd region, began to rise to power under the leadership of Mohammad
ibn Saud. Mohammad ibn Saud successfully gathered the support of other local tribes by
forming an alliance with Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the strict Wahhabi
branch of Islam.255 The Al Saud tribe began to expand and consolidate its power across the
peninsula using Wahhabism as a source of legitimacy. 256
When Mohammad ibn Saud died in 1765, parts of central and eastern Arabia were under
Saudi/Wahhabi control. Upon Mohammad ibn Saud’s death, his son Abd al-Aziz succeeded
him, expanding the tribe’s power even further, until his death in 1803. 257 Abd al-Aziz’s son,
Saud, succeeded him. On the Wahhabi side of the alliance, Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab died
in 1792.258 As a result of the Al Saud tribe’s expansion, the central Ottoman leadership began to
take more notice of the tribe’s activities at the turn of the 19 th century. Conflict ensued between
the Al Saud tribe/Wahhabis and the Ottomans, and in 1804, the Al Saudi tribe captured Medina,
briefly extending its power across portions of the whole peninsula. In 1814, Saud died, and his
son, Abdullah, succeeded him. 259 Abdullah was unable to continue expanding and consolidating
the Al Saud tribe’s power. In 1818, when a period of fighting with the Ottomans concluded,
many Saudi and Wahhabi leaders were sent to Constantinople to be executed. Saudi expansion
of power was temporarily stymied. 260
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Ibn Saud

The second period of Al Saud dominance in the peninsula began in 1824. Mohammad ibn
Saud’s grandson, Turki, reasserted Saudi leadership by establishing a center of power in the city
of Riyadh.261 Turki’s son, Faisal, succeeded him, and ruled until 1865. 262 During Faisal’s rule,
though the Hejaz remained under Hashemite control, the majority of Northern Arabia recognized
Riyadh as the seat of power. Faisal continued to expand and consolidate Saudi power. 263 When
Faisal died in 1865, succession disputes ensued. These disputes weakened the Al Saud tribe’s
ability to maintain power in the peninsula, and in 1891, the Rashid tribe conquered Riyadh. 264
The second period of Al Saud dominance in the peninsula had come to an end. 265
Upon conquering Riyadh, the Rashid tribe exiled many members of the Al Saud
leadership and their families. The future founder of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud, was exiled to
Kuwait. During his exile, he became educated and built up a military following. In 1901, Ibn
Saud and a small armed force marched to Riyadh and defeated the Rashid governor in 1902. 266
With Riyadh once again under Saudi control, Ibn Saud began to consolidate his power within the
peninsula. Like previous Saudi leadership, Ibn Saud relied on Wahhabism to lend his efforts
legitimacy.267 Part of his strategy to gain control in the peninsula involved creating a stronger
administration and establishing a stronger a military force. 268 In 1912, Ibn Saud established the
ikhwan, a military force made up primarily of Bedouin tribe members.269 The ikhwan also
assumed the role of a moral and religious police force, upholding the values of Wahhabism. 270
By the turn of the 20th century, Ibn Saud’s power was still concentrated in the eastern and
central parts of the peninsula. The British incorporated the Hashemites into their war efforts in
World War I, but the territory controlled by Ibn Saud remained out of the war. 271 Despite the
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lack of any physical intervention on the part of the British, they nonetheless helped pave the way
for eventual Saudi statehood by weakening Hashemite power in the Hejaz and by contributing to
the region’s economic development through oil subsidies. In terms of the former, the British
weakened Hashemite power after the events5 surrounding Sharif Hussein and his sons
transpired.272 With the Hashemites weakened in the Hejaz, Ibn Saud attacked Mecca and
Medina, effectively extending his power across the entire Arabian Peninsula. 273 In terms of the
latter, British and American purchases of oil, which they had discovered in the early 20 th century,
helped the region’s economy develop rapidly. Large sums of money flowing into the region in
the form of oil rents cemented a rentier economic system that helped Ibn Saud develop the future
Saudi state.274
Throughout the 1920s, Ibn Saud used the wealth derived from oil to modernize the
territory. He implemented a rudimentary system of tax collection and established
communication and transportation systems that helped increase peripheral ties to his center of
power.275 Ibn Sau struggled to establish a balance between conservative elements and those who
favored modernization. 276 Realizing that he could not consolidate his power without the support
of conservative Bedouin factions, he worked to gain their support by using Wahhabism as a
legitimizing force. 277 Eventually, Ibn Saud was able to consolidate his power across the vast
territory. He connected the periphery to the center of power in Riyadh through increased
communication and transportation and used Wahhabism as a legitimizing tool. In 1932, he
declared himself the ruler of a new state, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with Riyadh as its
capital.278

5

I outlined these events in the previous chapter on Jordan.
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The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Upon establishing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud began to further consolidate his
power by implementing a national budget and a stronger system of taxation. 279 The ulema had
significant power within the government. Members of the ulema served in advisory roles to the
Saudi regime on matters such as education and even foreign policy. 280 Wahhabism proved to be
a useful political tool for binding together various factions of society, effectively forming the
basis of a national identity in the state. 281 Additionally, Islamic Shari ‘a law formed the basis of
state law. No other formal constitution was created, nor were there any institutions that
represented real checks on the king’s power. Ibn Saud ruled as an absolute monarch and even
the religious establishment had to defer to him for the final say on any domestic or international
policy.
During the first years of his tenure as king, Ibn Saud saw to the unification of the western
and eastern regions of the peninsula, but the final borders of the new state took some time to
become firmly cemented. To the north, there were ongoing tribal raids across the TransjordanSaudi Arabia border. To the south, only after border conflict with Yemen ended in 1934, did the
present-day Saudi Arabia-Yemen border become established. Borders with Saud Arabia’s other
neighbors became firmly fixed by the 1950s. 282

The Effects of Oil

Rents stemming from Western purchases of oil began to exponentially shape the Saudi economy
and society in the 1940s. By 1941, at the beginning of World War II, the British and Americans
had fully exploited Saudi oil reserves. 283 To manage oil production and the resulting wealth, the

56

Americans, in collaboration with the Saudi government, established ARAMCO, the ArabianAmerican Oil Company. 284 During World War II, an increased need for oil to fuel Allied war
efforts led to a dramatic spike in oil wealth in Saudi Arabia. Large oil rents allowed the regime
to provide its citizens with extensive subsidies without them having to significantly contribute to
the state’s economic revenue in the form of taxes. 285 Oil wealth also allowed for continued
modernization of transportation, communication, infrastructure, public schools, and education. 286
These developments led to greater consolidation of state power.
There were, however, downsides to the oil wealth. Saudi leaders’ heavy reliance on
wealth derived from oil discouraged them from diversifying the state’s economy, thus increasing
the risk of Dutch Disease. 6 Furthermore, unsurprisingly, the dramatic spike in wealth caused
increased corruption, wastefulness, and lavishness within the regime. Though initially faced
with an economic surplus, the Saudi government was forced to begin borrowing in the 1950s due
to a rising deficit from a lack of prudent financial management of its oil wealth. Furthermore,
the modernizing changes taking place caused a rift between conservative religious elements and
the regime.287 Ibn Saud himself became overwhelmed with the fast-paced nature of societal
changes. On November 9, 1953, he died, disappointed with the trajectory of his country. 288

Conservative-Modern Tensions

Upon Ibn Saud’s death, Saud, his eldest son, succeeded him. Saud’s ascension to the monarchy
represented a continuation of the old regime. However, Saud’s selected heir, Crown Prince

6

Dutch Disease is when a country relies so heavily on one industry for economy revenue that it fails to diversify its
economy. A collapse or downturn in the industry upon which the country relies then has devastating effects on the
country’s economy because it relies solely on that industry to generate revenue (Hertog, “Shaping the Saudi State,”
539).
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Faisal, advocated for modernizing the country. Throughout the 1950s, the rivalry between Saud
and Faisal hindered effective governance. The wider royal family became increasingly worried
about the trajectory of the country under Saud.289 In March 1958, a council composed of
members of the royal family took a vote to oust Saud and put Faisal in power. 290 Over the next
few years, Faisal assumed an increasing number of responsibilities, and on November 2, 1964,
he became king with the support of the ulema.291 As king, Faisal lived up to expectations: he
increased the efficiency of the state bureaucracy and used Saudi Arabia’s Islamic hegemony to
place it in a powerful regional position. 292 He also continued to invest oil wealth in the
development of infrastructure, job training programs for public sector positions, healthcare and
welfare services, and communication services. These developments helped him consolidate state
power.293
As the budget, bureaucracy, and prosperity of the state continued to expand throughout
the 1960s, a new middle class developed in society. 294 Faisal, however, sought to ensure that it
did not become too powerful. 295 He also attempted to increase his control over the ulema by
creating roles within the government for members of the ulema that were directly accountable to
him.296 Faisal also strengthened Saudi Arabia’s ties with the United States not only in an
economic sense, but also in a strategic sense.297 Encouraged by the US, he used oil rents to
augment Saudi Arabia’s military forces. 298

A Regional Giant

Cognizant of its influence as a major producer of oil, Saudi Arabia formed the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 1960s to represent these countries’ oil interests.
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However, Saudi Arabia was unable to fully nationalize its oil until 1988. Saudi Arabia’s
ongoing economic and strategic alliance with the US roped the kingdom into the Cold War.299
For the US, Saudi Arabia was a key factor in maintaining a balance of power in the Middle East,
since Saudi Arabia actively disagreed with Nasser’s Pan-Arab, left-leaning, ideology in Egypt. 300
The balance of power provided by Saudi Arabia ensured regional stability and an uninterrupted
flow of oil to Western states. 301
Despite the strong Saudi-American alliance, relations were not always cordial between
the two states. In 1973, when the US supported Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur war, Faisal
retaliated by decreasing the amount of oil Saudi Arabia supplied to the US in hopes of creating a
shortage.302 Oil prices in the US spiked dramatically in 1973, yet the US did not change its
policy or its actions vis-à-vis Israel, as Faisal hoped it would. Instead, Saudi Arabia’s actions
merely compelled the US to engage in greater oil exploration and find alternative sources of the
resource, hurting Saudi Arabia’s economy. 303
King Faisal was assassinated in March 1975. His half-brother, the Crown Prince Khaled,
succeeded him, and Prince Fahd became the new Crown Prince. Economic and social
development increased under Khaled. The 1979 Iranian Revolution and the subsequent rise of
Ayatollah Khomeini’s theocratic Shia government posed a direct challenge to Saudi Arabia’s
regional power and Islamic hegemony. Both events helped resurface the centuries-old SunniShia tensions. 304 Soon after the Iranian Revolution, there was an attack on the Great Mosque in
Mecca.305 A group of religiously radical rebels, citing a need to target immoral behavior and
corruption in the country and royal family, seized the mosque. The Saudi government blamed
Iran, yet it turned out that a Saudi national had led the rebels.306 In response to this event and the
Iranian Revolution in general, the Saudi regime took measures to augment the strict religious
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nature of society to rival such changes in Iran. 307 Women were prohibited from being in public
without being completely covered, and the number of women in the workforce declined. 308 In
essence, the Iranian Revolution pushed Saudi Arabia to evolve into the strict, overtly religious,
society it is today. 309
On June 3, 1982, King Khaled died; he w as succeeded by Crown Prince Fahd. As king,
Fahd maintained Saudi Arabia’s close relationship with the United States and increased the
country’s purchases of military equipment from both the US and Britain. In keeping with the
post-1979 societal changes, Fahd worked closely with the ulema to further his religious image. 310
Fahd was concerned with safeguarding the Saudis’ connection with Wahhabism, mostly as a
means to oppose Iran’s rising religious influence in the region. 311 Saudi Arabia faced a series of
domestic and international challenges in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including a downturn in
oil prices, ongoing tensions with Iran, and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and subsequent US
invasion of Iraq. The slump in oil prices forced the government to cut back on the welfare
programs on which the public had come to rely. Furthermore, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in an
attempt to gain control of Kuwait’s oil reserves, Saudi Arabia felt its stability and security
threatened. The regime quickly called in US reinforcements, much to the displeasure of the
domestic population and other Arab states. 312 The regime was forced to obtain a religious
decree, or fatwah, in an attempt to legitimize its collaboration with the US.313 The US’s invasion
of Iraq during the First Gulf War, during which the US military operated, in large part, out of
Saudi Arabia, created further anger amongst the population. 314 As a result, there was a
resurgence of religious activism within the country in protest of the war and the continued
presence of the US military. 315
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Modern-Day

Today, the Saudi regime continues to rely on strict Wahhabi principles to lend it legitimacy.316
The Saudi-Wahhabi alliance remains a powerful status quo that is impossible to challenge,
especially given that Saudi Arabia has a weak civil society317 and the ulema’s influence within
the state apparatus. 318 On an international level, Saudi Arabia continues to have a special
relationship with the United States, despite disagreement on human and women’s rights. 319
Saudi Arabia has still not managed to effectively diversify its economy. A recent decline
in oil prices and rising unemployment amongst its young population are threatening the domestic
stability of the state. There are some members within the regime who realize that modernization
and social change must take place in order to preserve stability within the state. 320 In 2011, King
Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud granted women the right to vote in an effort to maintain Saudi
Arabia’s modern image in the eyes of the international community. 321 Recently, the current
Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman, or MBS, expressed a desire to move Saudi Arabia away
from its reliance on oil. 322 Additionally, this past November, he cracked down on corruption
within the regime by targeting influential members of the royal family and jailing them for
dishonest fiscal activities. 323 However, his actions lacked transparency and it remains unclear as
to his motives.324 MBS has called this crackdown, “shock therapy” to root out corruption. 325
Some of the social changes MBS has supported are allowing women to drive as of June 2018 and
creating women-only sections at sports stadiums.326 MBS shows no intention, however, of
supporting or initiating political change. 327 Furthermore, tensions with Iran remain high over
which state has Islamic hegemony. This tension continues to play out in devastating proxy wars
across the Middle East, most recently in Yemen and Syria. 328
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ANALYSIS

Saudi Arabia covers most of the Arabian Peninsula. The vastness of the territory made it
difficult for any single tribe or group to consolidate power prior to the 20th century. The
peninsula’s population has always been fairly homogenous, and the predominant social structure
has been a tribal one. The 1744 alliance between the Al Saud tribe and the Wahhabi branch of
Islam provided the Al Saud tribe with a source of legitimacy. This legitimacy allowed the tribe
to begin to conquer the peninsula, consolidate its power, and subjugate and unify tribes. Given
Saudi Arabia’s early history, it can be proposed that:

Hypothesis 1: The vastness of the territory and the tribal structure of society prevented
the emergence of a core group of elites able to unify economically and politically and
consolidate their power.

Other factors, however, undercut the significance of the aforementioned condition:

Hypothesis 2: The region’s homogeneity helped the central Al Saud leadership to
establish core-periphery ties and consolidate its power.

Hypothesis 3: Wahhabism lent the Al Saud tribe legitimacy that helped tribal leadership
to establish core-periphery ties and to consolidate its power.
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The second era of Saudi expansion began in 1824. By 1891, internal disputes had
weakened the Al Saud tribe, and the Rashid tribe took Riyadh and exiled Ibn Saud, the future
founder of Saudi Arabia, to Kuwait. In 1902, Ibn Saud rallied a group to march to Riyadh and
reclaim power from the Rashids. He expanded and consolidated his power with the help of a
newly strengthened alliance with the Wahhabis. In 1912, Ibn Saud established the ikhwan,
which he used to continue to expand his power across the peninsula. During World War I, the Al
Saud tribe remained neutral, but in the Hejaz, the Hashemites were incorporated into the war
efforts by the British. After the war, the Hashemites’ position was significantly weakened. The
weakened state of the Hashemites greatly aided Ibn Saud’s efforts to expand and consolidate his
power. By the end of World War I, he was finally able to conquer the Hejaz and take the holy
cities of Mecca and Medina. In addition, wealth from oil, which had been discovered in the early
20th century, helped Ibn Saud expedite a process of state creation. Foreign purchases of oil also
led to the rapid development of the region’s economy. After a decade in the 1920s of using oil
wealth to build up state apparatuses and bureaucracies, and to modernize the country, Ibn Saud
declared the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.
The rentier economic system that developed in Saudi Arabia due to foreign oil purchases
ensured that the state’s economy would develop without significant contributions from citizens
in the form of taxes. Within the political system, Ibn Saud held ultimate power as king, and his
family members filled other positions in government. The ulema played a large role in the
regime as well. Islamic Shari ‘a law formed the basis of the new state’s constitution, and Ibn
Saud allowed religious leaders to have influence in areas not normally within their jurisdiction,
such as foreign policy. Wahhabism, which had long been an effective unifying force, proved to
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be an effective basis of national identity as well. Given this part of Saudi Arabia’s history, it can
be proposed that:

Hypothesis 4: The creation of the ikhwan helped to draw Bedouin tribes into Ibn Saud’s
center of power prior to the creation of the state. This measure increased the ties between
the core and the periphery and helped Ibn Saud to consolidate his power prior to the
creation of the state.

Hypothesis 5: The development of the oil industry, and the economic subsidies derived
from it, aided Saudi Arabia’s state creation process.
Hypothesis 5a: Improvements in infrastructure, communication and transportation
as a result of oil wealth increased core-periphery ties and aided with the
consolidation of state power.
Hypothesis 5b: However, Saudi Arabia’s rentier economic system, combined with
a monarchical regime structure, reduced the regime’s accountability to the
population. This lack of accountability hindered participation and contestation
and precluded the development of a democratic regime.

State creation and Ibn Saud’s power consolidation did not occur without challenges. A
struggle emerged between conservative and modernizing elements within the country as rapid
developments took place in society. Additionally, border disputes with neighboring states such
as Transjordan and Yemen challenged the borders of the new state. Despite these challenges,
Ibn Saud was able to use the economic subsidies derived from oil to increasingly consolidate his
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power and establish strong core-periphery links. During World War II, when the Allied powers’
need for oil increased, there was a spike in oil wealth flowing into the country. Ibn Saud used
this wealth to make additional modernizing changes, including developments in communication,
technology, and transportation. By the 1950s-1960s, the strength and scope of the state’s
bureaucracy and administration had increased. The political system, however, remained
stagnant, participation and contestation remained nonexistent, and civil society continued to be
weak. Large quantities of oil wealth had negative side effects. In the 1950s and 1960s,
corruption and misuse of government funds were prevalent within the regime. Furthermore,
tensions between the regime and the conservative ulema continued to rise as a result of the rapid
modernization. Given this part of Saudi Arabia’s history, it can be proposed that:

Hypothesis 6: Border disputes over the first few decades of Saudi Arabia’s statehood
posed a threat to the physical scope of the state, challenging Ibn Saud’s ability to
consolidate state power.

Another factor, however, undercut the significance of the aforementioned condition:

Hypothesis 7: Wealth from oil rents contributed to the strengthening of state
bureaucracies and the state apparatus. This development allowed Ibn Saud’s to
further consolidate state power.

In terms of the political regime:
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Hypothesis 8: Corruption within the regime prevented state institutions from serving the
population effectively. This condition obstructed political liberalization.

The nature of Saudi Arabia’s society changed after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The
revolution challenged Saudi Arabia’s status as the regional Islamic hegemon, and since that time,
relations between the two states have been tenuous. The Iranian Revolution prompted the Saudi
regime to tighten its control over society and augment the strict religious nature of the state. The
regime granted the ulema more influence in all aspects of Saudi society.
By the 1980s, Saudi Arabia had become the largest producer and exporter of oil.
Increasing revenue from oil led to economic and social changes, yet the political system
remained stagnant. However, the lack of economic diversification meant that any decrease in oil
prices, such as those that occurred after Saudi Arabia’s attempted embargo on shipments to the
US in 1973, threatened the welfare of its citizens.
Some unprecedented changes have taken place in recent years. In 2011, women were
granted the right to vote and as of June 2018, women will be allowed to drive. The current
Crown Prince, MBS, is attempting to move the country away from its reliance on oil, so as to
diversify the economy. Despite social and economic changes in recent years, the population has
no political outlet for protest and civil society remains weak. Political positions within the
regime remain limited to the royal family. Given Saudi Arabia’s recent history, it can be
proposed that:

Hypothesis 9: Societal changes after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the ongoing
influence of religious establishment, have led to societal conditions that hinder equal
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status for half the population. This exclusion hinders the potential for political
liberalization.

Hypothesis 10: The view of democracy as an inherently Western concept, combined with
prevalent anti-Western sentiment and a weak civil society, decreases the chance that the
population will call for greater political liberalization.

Despite the aforementioned conditions, recent social liberalization indicates that, perhaps,
political liberalization could follow in the future:

Hypothesis 11: Women gaining the right to vote in 2011 increased political participation.
This measure is a positive indicator for potential political liberalization. In addition,
recent social changes for women provide greater equality for half the population. These
changes could also represent positive indicators for future political liberalization.

Conclusion

The monarchical regime structure of Saudi Arabia, still comprised of Ibn Saud’s family
members, remains strong. However, a decline in oil prices and reserves have forced some
leaders in the regime to begin to think about alternative ways to stimulate the Saudi economy. If
the Saudi regimes hopes to is critical that it does so since the population has come to rely on
economic subsidies. Should these subsidies cease, there could be popular uprisings that would
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threaten the stability of the regime. For the moment, participation and contestation remain
almost non-existent, and civil society remains weak. There have been social changes recently
that have granted women greater rights and opportunities within society, however these changes
have not spilled over into the political sphere. It will be crucial moving forward to continue to
monitor the social, economic, and political conditions to see if there are any indicators of
potential regime change or political liberalization.
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CHAPTER III
Iran and the Political Liberalization that Could Have Been

Introduction

Iran presents the most complex case of the three considered in this study. The region had a rich
history prior to the 20th century characterized by a cycle of conquerors. Despite the myriad of
powers that controlled the region, the population retained a strong sense of its pre-Islamic
Persian identity. In the 20th century, Iran had a significantly more intricate process of regime
building than did the other two previous cases. Unlike Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Iran
experienced a variety of regime types throughout the 20 th century. Within the same century, Iran
evolved from a monarchical system, to an authoritarian system, to experiencing increasing
political liberalization, to a theocracy based on politicized Shiism. The questions I address in
this chapter are threefold: How has the population managed to maintain a strong sense of its preIslamic cultural and linguistic identity? How and why has the regime changed in the way it has?
Will the regime remain a theocracy or could it politically liberalize in the future?
As in the previous two cases, I first provide a brief overview of Iran’s complex history. I
then posit an original analysis of Iran’s processes of state creation and regime building, and why
it has not democratized. I argue that in the case of Iran, the main factors influencing its
processes of state creation and regime building are a strong sense of cultural and linguistic
Persian identity, the creation of a rentier economic system as a result of foreign oil purchases,
foreign intervention in the state’s political regime, and the role of politicized Shiism.
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Geography and Early History

The area of present-day Iran is a plateau of land enclosed by three mountain ranges: the Zagros,
the Elburz and the Kuh-e-Taftan.329 Two rivers, the Tigris River in the West to the Oxus River
in the East represent the Western and Eastern borders of the region. 330 The climate is mild in the
desert and plains, however two-thirds of Iran is wasteland, with a rugged terrain and bad soil. 331
The large landmass of the territory made transportation, communication, and maintaining
consolidated power challenging prior to the 20th century.332
Tribes have been a powerful social force for much of the region’s history, and often
resisted each new central authority’s attempts to consolidate power.333 Religion in the region has
been complex. Prior to the Arab conquest and spread of Islam, the main religion in the region
was Zoroastrianism. Today, 99% of the population is Muslim, and the majority are Twelver
Shiites.334 Despite the deep impact Islam has had on the region, the population maintains a
strong sense of its pre-Islamic Persian identity, as demonstrated by the survival of the Persian
language through the Arab, and subsequent, conquests.335
The Sassanians were the first major power of note in the region. The Sassanians initiated
a process of power consolidation, whereby independent areas became increasingly tied to a more
unified administration. This process strengthened core-periphery ties.336 The official religion of
the government was Zoroastrianism. 337 The main cause of the Sassanians’ downfall was the
Arab conquest of the region around 630 AD.338 By 651 AD, the conquest was complete, and the
Persian population had been incorporated into the new Arab caliphate.339 The spread of Islam
irrevocably shaped the region -- the Zoroastrian religion declined, 340 but the Persian language
and culture survived. 341
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Persian elites established roles for themselves in the administration of the Arab caliphate,
converting to Islam in order to maintain their power. 342 After the collapse of the original four
Arab caliphs, the Umayyads who assumed power continued to rely on Persian elites in their
administration.343 The Abbasids defeated the Umayyads after the latter had ruled for almost 100
years. A Persian man named Abu Muslim initiated the Abbasid revolt in support, albeit false
support, of Shiism.344 Despite having risen to power with the support of the Shiite population in
the region, the Abbasids embraced orthodox Sunni Islam after establishing their caliphate.345
Like the Umayyads, the Abbasids relied on Persian administrators and borrowed many aspects of
Persian culture. 346 Eventually, the vast size of the territory controlled by the Abbasids posed a
challenge to effective consolidation of their power and their caliphate weakened, though it did
not collapse until 1258. 347
The next major power to sweep through the region were the Seljuk Turks in the mid 11 th
century. Again, Persian elites played a central role in the Seljuk administration. 348 By the end
of the 12th century, however, the empire under the Seljuks had split into various factions ruled by
different tribes.349 The Seljuks were unable to maintain their power in the empire. 350
The Mongols, a highly skilled army of warriors originating in East Asia charged into the
region. By 1258, they had ousted the Seljuks and had established a capital in Tabriz. 351 The
Mongols effectively brought an end to Abbasid power. As under previous rulers, Persian
language, culture, and poetry survived. Persian scholars and administrators maintained their
power by making themselves indispensable to the Mongol leadership. 352 By the late 15th
century, Mongol control over the region had weakened due to tensions within the central
leadership.353 The next power to sweep the region were the Safavids, a Turkish tribe from the
East. The Safavids deserve to be discussed separately from the rest of the pre-20th century
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powers given the extent to which they shaped the political, cultural, and economic systems in the
region.

The Safavids

The Safavids initiated a process of political, cultural, and economic changes in the region. The
most noticeable change was the population’s rejection of Sunnism and their adoption of Twelver
Shiism.354 This change has endured—today, Twelver Shiism remains the dominant form of
Islam in the region. 355 By the end of the 15th century, the leader of the Safavids, Isma’il, had
expanded Safavid influence. He conquered Tabriz, the Mongol capital, and declared himself
Shah at the age of fourteen. 356 Isma’il made a great effort to distinguish his empire from that of
the Sunni Ottomans to the West. One of the ways in which he did so was by proclaiming
Twelver Shiism the official religion of the government. 357 The Ottomans posed a significant
challenge to the Safavids, and the two empires continually vied for power. 358
In 1587, Shah Abbas, best know as Abbas the Great, assumed power and undertook a
series of reforms. He established a standing army at Isfahan, the Safavid capital, and also started
a series of reformative policies such as land taxation. 359 In addition, Abbas increased the amount
of land dedicated for religious purposes. This measure cemented a strong relationship between
the religious establishment and the government. 360 Abbas was more successful in consolidating
his power than any previous leader because he institutionalized Shiism, created a sophisticated
administration, and set territorial boundaries. 361 Abbas died in 1629 and a decade later, after
frequent territorial conflicts, the Ottomans and the Safavids established a tentative peace. 362
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By the 18th century, the Persian Empire under the Safavids had strong borders, a fairly
strong economy that included trade with Europe, a functional regional administration, a system
of taxation, albeit rudimentary, and a powerful army. However, throughout the 18 th century, the
Safavid empire began to weaken as a result of foreign influences. 363

Foreign Intervention

In 1736, Nader, a Safavid military leader, regained some territory that had been lost to the
Ottomans. He subsequently declared himself Shah, effectively ending the period of the Safavid
rule.364 In 1616, the Safavids had formed an alliance with the British East India Company and
allowed it to start trading in Persia. 365 As Shah, Nader strengthened such existing economic ties
with foreign powers. He also formed a military alliance with Russian forces on the northern
border of the region in the Caucasus. 366 Furthermore, he allowed the British to continue using
the region to trade and gain access to their colony in India. 367
In 1786, the Qajar tribe, led by Agah Mohammad, conquered the city of Tehran, and
established it as their capital. 368 Tehran remains the capital to this day. Under the Qajars,
foreign intervention in Persia increased exponentially. 369 The British East India Company
increased its trade with the region, and Russia began to make claims to territory in the
Caucasus.370 Fath, Agha’s nephew and successor, attempted to maintain control over what
would become the state of Georgia, but his efforts to hold onto the territory failed. By 1799, the
Russians had established themselves as protectorates of the territory.371 After losing territory
during the Caucasus Wars in the late 18th-early 19th centuries, the Persians reached a treaty with
the Russians in 1813. The treaty gave the Russians control over the territory they had conquered,
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forced the Persian government to pay reparations, and enabled the Russians to increase their
influence in Persian governmental affairs. 372 Despite increased foreign intervention, the Qajars
managed to maintain control of the Persian Empire throughout the 19 th century. This condition
would change in the 20th century.

Persia in the 20th Century
By the 20th century, the Qajars were still in power, but some segments of the population began to
call for measures to limit the power of the Shah. 373 In 1906, inspired by the West, members of
the bazaar class7 launched the Constitutional Revolution. 374 As a result of their protests, the
Shah at the time, fearing instability, agreed to ratify the proposed constitution. The constitution
established a judicial body and called for a representative national assembly, the majles, which
met for the first time in 1906. 375 The majles was elected on partial suffrage: only middle to
upper class men, members of the ulema, and merchants could vote. 376 The constitution also
declared Shiism as the official religion of the government. 377 The constitution was ratified on
December 30, 1906, and between 1907 and 1908, the elected majles implemented tax, finance,
education, and judicial reforms. 378 Though most of the reforms did not endure past 1911 when
the next Qajar Shah assumed absolute power,379 the constitution itself endured until 1979. 380
Another transformative event in the early 20th century was the discovery of oil. In 1901,
William Knox D’Arcy, a British entrepreneur, obtained a concession from the Persian
government to explore for oil.381 The discovery of the lucrative natural resource led to
increasing foreign intervention in the region, and ultimately to the development of a rentier

7

The bazaar class was a low social class comprised of small market merchants who engaged in trading and bartering
in outdoor markets, the bazaar. This class eventually became the basis of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Axworthy,
Empire of the Mind, 211).
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economic system. 382 A rising power, the United States, also began to play an increasing role in
the region as a result of the discovery.383 When World War I began in 1914, Persia was roped
into the war efforts because it could provide the Allies with oil. 384 At the conclusion of the war
in 1918, the Allies’ victory meant a defeat of the Ottoman Empire, which had made the fatal
mistake of allying with the Germans. 385 A long-time rival of the Persian Empire had been
eliminated.

Reza Khan

After World War I, the British began to prep a Qajar military leader, Reza Khan, to assume
power in the empire. Encouraged by the British, Reza Khan marched with a military force to
Tehran and on February 16, 1921, defeated the Qajar leadership and assumed power. 386 In 1921,
the fourth majles, an institution that had endured authoritarian Qajar Shahs and the collapse of
the Qajars, convened and gave Reza its full support. 387 In 1923, Reza Shah made himself prime
minister, and the old Qajar Shah went into exile in Europe. 388 A new regime had begun.
To modernize the country, and to initiate a process of state creation and power
consolidation, Reza Khan implemented a number of reforms. His top priorities were to
strengthen the armed forces, regulate state revenue, and modernize the region’s infrastructure.
Most of those changes, however,, were limited to Tehran. 389 In addition, Reza invested in
industry and expanded education. 390 Not all of Reza’s changes were welcomed. In order to
maintain his power, he limited freedom of speech and expression, and increased censorship of
the press.391 One of his most controversial changes was banning the veiling of women and
forcing Western-style dress on the whole population. Reza had hoped that modernization would
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lead to greater autonomy from foreign powers, but due to the desirability of oil, Reza was forced
to accept continued foreign economic intervention. 392 Though Reza was successful in
consolidating his power and initiating a process of state creation, he did so in an authoritarian
manner at the expense of a liberalized, representative government.393 The institution of the
majles continued to exist, but its power was severely diminished. 394
Alongside his processes of state creation and power consolidation, Reza engaged in a
process of nation building. One of his main goals was to define the ‘Iranian nation’.395 In 1926,
Reza declared himself Shah, taking the last name Pahlavi. 396 This name stemmed from preIslamic Persian times, and Reza hoped to harken back to Persia’s early roots as a way of binding
together the population. 397 He also ‘Persianized’ the Persian language, although he retained the
use of the Arabic script. He also changed the nascent state’s name from ‘Persia’ to ‘Iran’, the
ancient name for the region. 398 As Reza Shah built up the nation in the 1920s and 1930s, the
ulema lost many of its powers, but began to develop a separate identity that would manifest itself
later on in the century. 399 Despite his complicated relationship with the ulema, Reza realized he
had to embrace Shiism as a unifying factor. 400 He legitimized his rule by gaining the approval
of the ulema,401 which resulted in the creation of a connection between the religious
establishment and the state. 402
The new state of Iran was unable to escape the impact of World War II. Leading up to
the war, Reza had grown increasingly frustrated with British and Russian intervention in the
state. When the war began, he allied himself with the Germans. 403 In response, the British and
Russians increased their presence in the country in an attempt to maintain their access to oil.404
Reza’s frustration with the British and the Russians prompted him to establish stronger ties with
the United States. At the end of the war, Germany’s loss meant that Reza Shah was forced to

76

surrender to the Allies and abdicate the throne to his son Mohammad Reza Shah.405 The period
of Reza’s ability to shape the Iranian state had come to an end.

Mohammad Mossadegh

Iran experienced several important domestic political changes during the 1940s. The number of
political parties increased, as well as the dissemination of information through the use of radio
and newspapers.406 In 1944, men of voting age—women did not get the right to vote until about
twenty years later—elected the first general representation majles since the 1920s.407 In the
election of 1950, the Leftist/Communist Tudeh party, led by Mohammad Mossadegh, won a
number of seats in the majles.408 The Tudeh party had run on a platform of increased political
participation and the nationalization of the country’s oil. When the Shah-backed Prime Minister,
Ali Razmara, was assassinated in 1951, Mossadegh became prime minister.409 Under his
leadership, the majles voted to nationalize Iran’s oil on March 15, 1951. 410 Nationalization did
not have the intended effect -- the British imposed a blockade that prevented oil from being
exported which in turn destabilized Iran’s economy. 411 Mossadegh’s actions as prime minister
made the US increasingly worried about Communist influences within the country. With
Britain’s help, the US derived a plan to oust Mossadegh.412 In 1953, the CIA launched a coup
against Mossadegh, and put power entirely back into the hands of Mohammad Reza Shah. The
people of Iran, who viewed Mohammad Reza Shah as a puppet of the West, were furious at the
breach of their sovereignty.413
The religious establishment took advantage of the population’s anger. In 1963, a
religious figure named Ayatollah Khomeini began preaching against the Shah’s government,
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claiming that it was neglecting the poor and failing to preserve Iran’s sovereignty against the
West.414 Khomeini also railed against Iran’s sale of oil to Israel. 415 In 1964, the Shah had
Khomeini arrested and exiled. Members of the religious bazaar class immediately protested, and
confrontation between the Iranian military and the protesters ensued.416 In an attempt to save
face with the population, Mohammad Reza Shah implemented some social and political changes,
including granting women the right to vote in 1963. 417

The Iranian Revolution

Mohammad Reza Shah’s efforts to appease the population were insufficient. His crackdowns on
dissent and a faltering economy angered the population. Iran’s ongoing rentier economic system
led to the emergence of a movement led by the deeply religious bazaar class, who protested the
country’s continued reliance on Western oil subsidies. 418 Unstable domestic conditions reached a
peak in the winter of 1978, during which time there were numerous protests and acts of violence.
December 11, 1978 marked a day of particularly violent protests in Tehran that resulted in a
prevailing lack of law and order and mass desertions from the army. 419 On January 16, 1979, the
Shah lost control of the country and fled. 420 Soon after, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran
after being in exile and established a theocracy based on politicized Shiism. 421
Upon assuming authority, Ayatollah Khomeini established a series of revolutionary
committees responsible for rounding up the remaining members of the Pahlavi regime. 422 The
Shia ulema became powerful and gained prominent positions in the new regime. 423 By the
autumn of 1979, liberal and moderate groups had been marginalized within the political system;
overshadowed by Khomeini’s Islamic Republic Party (IRP). 424 The IRP scrapped the old
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constitution, but drafted a new one similar in structure and stipulations to that of the old one.
The new constitution provided for a cabinet-like body, the Assembly of Experts made up of
members of the ulema, an elected president—as opposed to a prime minister previously—a
majles, and municipal councils. 425 In addition, it established the Council of Guardians made up
of twelve clerics and jurists, which was responsible for approving candidates before elections. 426
The constitution granted Khomeini supreme power and the authority to appoint members to the
Council of Guardians.427
In November of 1979, shortly after Ayatollah Khomeini took power, a group of students
broke into the United States embassy in Tehran and took hostages.428 Ayatollah Khomeini
backed the students’ actions. 429 Khomeini began to crack down on Westernizing influences in
society. In addition, he forced women to veil themselves and closed universities to discourage
Leftist activities. 430
During this same period, Iran faced a major challenge from one of its immediate
neighbors. In 1980, Saddam Hussein, the dictatorial leader of Iraq, attacked the IRP headquarters
and his forces invaded Iran. 431 An eight-year war followed, during which both sides, but
particularly Iran, suffered massive losses. 432 In 1988, acknowledging the weakness of its
position, the Iranian government accepted UN Resolution 598, which called for a ceasefire. 433
The war with Iraq damaged Iran’s economy and infrastructure, and many people were left
homeless.434 Ayatollah Khomeini passed away on June 3, 1989,435 but the theocratic regime he
had created endured.
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Modern-Day

Ayatollah Khamenei succeeded Ayatollah Khomeini.436 Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran’s president at
the time, had promised the Iranian people improved living standards and economic conditions
after the destructive war with Iraq. Khamenei obstructed the implementation of many of
Rafsanjani’s policies.437 And yet, despite post-war conditions, the theocratic regime managed to
improve infrastructure, health services, and education. 438 Social and legal equality for women,
however, decreased, though they retained the right to vote. 439
After Rafsanjani’s failure to bring about economic improvement, many in Iran rallied
around Mohammad Khatami in the 1997 elections. As Rafsanjani had done, Khatami ran on a
platform of economic reform. 440 His victory energized many young people and gave them hope
for changes in the future, including liberal political reforms. Under Khatami, press freedom did
increase, and a reformist 6th majles was elected in 2000.441 However, Ayatollah Khamenei
continued to block progressive changes, and Khatami was unable to deliver on many of his
campaign promises. 442 President Khatami also advocated increased openness with the United
States, but the hardline religious leadership also impeded the attempt.443
The events of September 11, 2001 drastically shaped Iran’s relationship with the United
States. Iran condemned the event and Khatami even offered to provide assistance to the United
States against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001. 444 However, US President George W. Bush
refused the offer. He rewarded Khatami’s offers of assistance by categorizing Iran as part of the
“Axis of Evil”, along with Iraq and North Korea, in his State of the Union speech in 2002.
Bush’s words angered many Iranians, and their anger was reflected in the election of President
Ahmadinejad in the 2005. Ahmadinejad had a colder view of the US than that of his
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predecessor, and his presidency signaled the beginning of a more confrontational relationship
between Iran and the US.445 Though Ahmadinejad also failed to deliver on many of his
economic reform promises, he was successful in using the West, particularly the United States,
as a scapegoat for domestic issues in Iran. 446
Today Iran’s civil society remains weak, peaceful demonstrations are often broken up,
and the dress code for women continues to be enforced. 447 A major issue for the Western
community is Iran’s development of nuclear materials, and its failure to meet nuclear safety
standards.448 The US and Israel have repeatedly said that they will not allow Iran to create or
acquire a nuclear weapon. Israel has justified its rhetoric given its proximity to Iran, and Iran’s
repeated calls for the destruction of Israel. 449 Iran is also at the center of another major source of
regional tension – its struggle with Saudi Arabian as to which power will be the Middle East’s
Islamic hegemon. Iran being Shia and Saudi Arabia being Sunni have carried out their struggle
for power in a series of devastating proxy wars in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria.450
Exacerbating the tension has been the United States’ close alliance with Saudi Arabia, and the
increased hostility between Washington and Tehran over nuclear weapons.451

ANALYSIS

The vastness of the early Persian Empire made communication, travel, and governance of remote
areas challenging. Before the 20th century, Iran was subject to a constant cycle of conquerors
who rose to power, expelled the previous leadership, and eventually met their own downfall.
The first of these powers were the Sassanians. Under the Sassanians, the predominant social
structure was a tribal one, and the official religion of the government was polytheistic
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Zoroastrianism. The Sassanians initiated a process of consolidating their power by increasing
core-periphery ties, yet they were not strong enough to resist the Arab conquest and the spread of
Islam.
The spread of Islam irrevocably altered the region. Most of the population eventually
converted to the new monotheistic religion, which soon became a large part of Persian identity.
Under the four original caliphs, as well as under the Umayyads and the Abbasids, Persian elites
assumed prominent roles within the respective administrations of these powers. Holding
prominent positions in each administration enabled Persians to ensure the endurance of the
Persian language and culture.
The Seljuks Turks next conquered the region. Like the previous leaders of the Persian
Empire, the Seljuks relied heavily on Persian elites in their administration. Rapid territorial
expansion under the Seljuks prevented the central leadership from effectively consolidating its
power across the vast territory. Core-periphery ties weakened leaving the territory susceptible to
conquest.
The Mongols took advantage of the Seljuks’ weakness. Once in power with a capital in
Tabriz, the Mongols continued the trend of utilizing Persian elites in running their
administration. By the late 15th century, Mongol control over the empire had weakened due to
both internal challenges and the external threat of the growing Ottoman Empire.
The next major power, the Safavids, irrevocably altered the political, cultural, and
economic systems within the Persian Empire. The Safavids imposed Shiism on society and
made it the official religion of the government. To this day, Shiism, particularly the branch of
Twelver Shiism, remains the predominant religion. In making Shiism the official religion of the
government, the Safavids set a precedent of politicizing Shiism. By the time the Safavids
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assumed control of the Persian Empire, the Ottoman Empire was a powerful entity, one that
repeatedly challenged the scope and strength of the Persian Empire. Another challenge to
Safavid power was increased interaction with Western powers, namely the British and the
Russians. The most influential Safavid leader, Abbas, consolidated his power more effectively
than any previous leader. However, the Safavids were not strong enough to endure continual
conflict with the Ottomans and foreign intervention in the territory.
Foreign intervention continued under the next rulers of the Persian Empire, the Qajars.
Constant guerilla-style battles with the Russians in the Caucasus, and ongoing struggles with the
British for control of trade routes in the Persian Gulf, hindered the ability of the Qajars to
completely consolidate their power. The Qajars did, however, establish an enduring capital in
Tehran. Thus, prior to the 20th century, it can be proposed that:

Hypothesis 1: The tribal structure of society, the vastness of the territory, and the
constant cycle of conquering hindered the ability of leaders in the early Persian
Empire to consolidate their power.

Hypothesis 2: Foreign intervention in the Persian Empire during the 18th and 19th
centuries hindered the ability of leaders in the Persian Empire to effectively consolidate
their power.

Other factors, however, undercut the significance of the aforementioned conditions:
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Hypothesis 3: The role of the Persian elites in each new conqueror’s administration
ensured the endurance of the Persian language and culture. This development would
eventually help the processes of state creation and nation building in the 20th century.

Hypothesis 4: The establishment and endurance of Tehran as the official capital under
the Qajars gave their leadership and subsequent governments a central point around
which to consolidate their power, increase core-periphery ties, and initiate the process of
state creation.

In 1906, while the Qajars were still in power, the bazaar class initiated the Constitutional
Revolution. Their proposed constitution called for elections, an elected representative body, the
majles, and a judicial body. Only men could vote at the time. By 1911, though many of the
reforms initiated by the revolution had collapsed when a new Shah had assumed power, the
institutions established by the constitution and the majles endured. Around the same time that
these political changes were taking place, the economic system in Persia was irrevocably altered
when the British discovered oil in the Persian Gulf. This discovery ensured a continued foreign
presence in the region, and Western oil purchases created a rentier economic system in the
region.
World War I eliminated Persia’s major regional rival, the Ottoman Empire, but the war
also weakened the Qajars. In 1921, Reza Khan, a military figure, launched a coup against the
Qajar leadership with the support of the British. Upon taking power, Reza initiated a process of
state creation and consolidation of his power. Between 1921 and 1930, Reza built up a stronger
military, developed a more efficient system of taxation, and implemented modernizing,
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Westernizing, changes in society. In an effort to foster a sense of nationalism, he assumed the
last name ‘Pahlavi’ and named the new state ‘Iran’. Reza was an authoritarian ruler who
modernized the state and consolidated his power in a manner that left no room for dissent. He
often came into conflict with the religious establishment due to the rapid pace of modernization.
During World War II, foreign intervention increased due to the Allied powers’ need for
oil to fuel the war efforts. Frustrated with the British and the Russians, Reza made the fatal
mistake of allying with the Germans. Despite their victory, the war weakened the British. As a
result, at the conclusion of the war, the US replaced Britain as the major benefactor of the Iranian
economy. Furthermore, with Germany having lost the war, the Allied powers forced Reza to go
into exile. His son, Mohammad Reza Shah, replaced him. Iranians did not fully support
Mohammad Reza Shah. Their disenchantment was reflected in the 1950 majles election, in
which the Leftist/Communist Tudeh party, led by Mohammad Mossadegh, won many seats. As
prime minister, Mossadegh began to deliver on his party’s promised reforms. In 1951, the
majles voted to nationalize Iran’s oil. Mossadegh’s rhetoric alarmed the US and Britain. In
1953, the CIA backed a coup that overthrew Mossadegh and placed decision-making power back
in the hands of the Shah.
The 1953 coup soured the Iranians’ view of the West, and of the Western-backed Shah.
By late 1978, tensions between the population and the Shah had reached a tipping point, and the
Shah had fled Iran. In February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to the country and
established a theocracy based on politicized Shiism. Khomeini and his party, the IRP,
implemented a new constitution that, though similar to the old one, outlined more of a role for
the religious establishment. The majles, and the role of the prime minister, now the president,
remained intact. Khomeini also implemented societal changes. For example, women were
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forced to cover their heads in public, though they retained the right to vote which they had
gained in 1963.
Throughout the last few decades of the 20th century, there were a number of presidents
who attempted to bring liberal reforms to the country, yet the powerful religious establishment
repeatedly blocked the attempts. Despite the highly religious nature of the Iranian regime, there
have been significant modernizing changes since 1979. The most recent aspect of Iran’s
modernization is its quest to produce nuclear material and obtain a nuclear weapon. This pursuit
has not helped to ameliorate relations between Iran and the West. In addition, Iran’s relationship
with Saudi Arabia has been tenuous since 1979. The two countries continue to vie for regional
power through a series of destructive proxy wars. Given Iran’s history in the 20th century, it can
be postulated:

Hypothesis 5: As a result of the Constitutional Revolution, elections, albeit with partial
suffrage, a representative body, and political parties were established. These
developments increased political liberalization.

A few factors throughout Iran’s 20th century history have undercut the liberalizing effect of the
Constitutional Revolution:

Hypothesis 6: Foreign purchases of Iranian oil created a rentier economic system. Iran’s
rentier economy, combined with an authoritarian regime, prevented the regime from
being accountable to the population. This development hindered participation and
contestation and precluded political liberalization.

86

Hypothesis 7: Reza’s authoritarian style of leadership and focus on militarization enabled
him to create the state and consolidate his power. However, these same factors hindered
participation and contestation and, as a result, obstructed political liberalization.

Hypothesis 8: Mossadegh’s platform of political and economic reform indicated a trend
toward increased political liberalization. However, the CIA’s intervention to oust
Mossadegh stymied liberalization of the political system.

Hypothesis 9: The 1979 Iranian Revolution was a response to the 1953 coup and the
changes implemented by the Shah thereafter.

Hypothesis 9a: The Shia theocracy created by Ayatollah Khomeini after the
Iranian Revolution decreased political participation and contestation.

Hypothesis 10: The view of democracy as an inherently Western concept, combined with
prevalent anti-Western sentiment and a weak civil society, decreases the chance that the
population will call for greater political liberalization.

The only positive indicator for political liberalization in this period of Iran’s history was women
gaining the right to vote in 1963. This measure marginally increased political liberalization.
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Conclusion

Iran’s theocracy remains strong, and its anti-Western rhetoric has fueled popular antagonism
towards the United States. Tensions between Iran and the international community remain high
over its creation of nuclear material. Though participation and contestation continue to exist in
the political system of the state, civil society is weak. Furthermore, elections are not always
entirely free and fair, and the president and majles only have a certain degree of influence -- the
religious establishment continues to have ultimate authority. Given Iran’s rich history of regime
transformation and use of popular protest to bring about regime change, there is the possibility
that the regime may yet again transform. It will be crucial to monitor Iran’s social, economic,
and political conditions moving forward to determine whether or not the conditions are right for
regime change and potential political liberalization.
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CHAPTER IV
A Comparative Analysis of the Processes of State Creation and
Regime Building in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran

The three states presented in this study share a number of important characteristics. First, none
of the original leaders intended to create a democratic regime, and none of the regimes is
currently democratic. Second, social and geographic conditions in each territory prior to the 20th
century and prior to state creation hindered the ability of elites in the territory to consolidate their
political power and engage in a process of state creation. Third, foreign intervention played a
large role in each country’s process of state creation, though the way in which they did was
different in each case. Finally, the role of religion impacted the processes of state creation and
regime building in each case, but to very different degrees.
This final chapter attempts to provide a comparative analysis in the form of hypotheses of
the various ideas presented in each of the case studies and their respective analyses. I begin the
chapter with presenting general time period-related hypotheses and conclusions on the processes
of state creation and regime building in the case of Jordan. Afterward, I provide the same
analysis for the cases of Saudi Arabia and Iran, but in a comparative format using the general
conclusions derived from the case of Jordan as the baseline conditions and theory. The case of
Saudi Arabia is significantly more complex than the case of Jordan, and the case of Iran is
markedly more complex than either Jordan or Saudi Arabia. In essence, Saudi Arabia and Iran
are both more intricate, and each one will add complexity to the theoretical framework created
by Jordan. I then highlight general hypotheses and posit a tentative theory of state creation,
regime building, and democratization for the Middle East derived from these three cases.
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The processes of state creation and regime building are related. Political regime building
takes places alongside state creation, but a democratic regime cannot fully develop without a
state in place. Furthermore, the nature of the state and the political regime often keeps evolving
throughout a country’s history, though to greater or lesser degrees. In his discussion of state
creation processes, Stein Rokkan identifies a number of factors that were integral to state
creation in the case of European states. Many of these factors highlight the importance of ethnic
and linguistic unification of the population in order to increase core-periphery ties. Rokkan also
identifies the role that religion can play in a process of state creation. Charles Tilly proposes that
state creation in Europe was largely affected by the presence of extractable resources and how
homogenous the population was of the territory. He also highlights that having a powerful
military can shape the process of state creation. Like Tilly, Samuel Huntington identifies the
role that a military can play in determining a territory’s process of state creation. He uses the
United States to conduct his analysis and outlines the role that state militias and subsequently the
US federal military played in the process of the consolidation of power in the US. Writing about
Latin America, Frank Safford highlights the role that economic integration, geography, and
religion played in the state creation processes of Latin American states. Fernando López-Alves
also describes the role that war and conflict played in the processes of state creation in Latin
American states.
Though none of the aforementioned authors wrote about state creation in the Middle East,
others have. There are two issues pertinent to the existing literature on state creation in the
Middle East. First, none of the authors outlines the actual processes of state creation. Second,
none of the authors discusses the processes in individual states; instead they tend to examine the
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Middle East as a whole. However, it is still worthwhile revisiting what many of them have said
with regards to state creation in the Middle East.
Roger Owen argues that in the Middle East, there is less distinction between the state,
regime, and government than in European states. This condition makes the nature of the state in
Middle Eastern countries fragile since if one aspect of this relationship collapses, so would the
rest. He categorizes state creation in the Middle East as occurring in three phases: the colonial
state, the immediate post-independent state, and the authoritarian state. None of those phases
however, explains the actual process within each stage. Owen also discusses the importance of a
rentier economic system and the military in shaping state creation in the Middle East. Beverley
Milton-Edwards, in turn, argues that state creation in the Middle East was often artificially
motivated by foreign powers. Finally, Simon Bromley argues that even before the 20th century,
there were indicators of potential state creation in the Middle East such as the tanzimat reforms
in the 19th century Ottoman Empire.
The hypotheses on state creation and regime building that I present in this section support
or refute to varying degrees the aforementioned arguments and are guided by the following
questions:

1. What conditions prevented political elites in the territories from coming together to
consolidate their power and initiate an early process of state creation?
2. What conditions in the territories prevented ties between the political core and the,
often tribal, periphery?
3. What conditions facilitated or obstructed political liberalization and the creation of a
democratic regime?
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I divide up the following hypotheses on state creation, regime building, and democratization by
time-period, focusing on pre and post state creation.

Pre-State Creation

Jordan

Prior to its creation by outside powers, the area of modern-day Jordan was a transitory area with
a tribal social structure. Eventually, the region came to fall under the governance of the powerful
Ottoman Empire. More so than any previous power, the Ottoman Empire began to shape the
social, economic, and political systems of the region. One of the ways in which it did so was
through the tanzimat reforms that increased the consolidation of Ottoman power and attempted
to increase ties between the Ottoman core and the tribal periphery.

Jordan Hypothesis 1: The entrenched tribal structure of society undermined the
Ottomans’ attempts to implement the tanzimat reforms in order to consolidate their power
prior to the 20th century.

After World War I, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the carving up of the territory
by the British and French enabled the mandate of Transjordan to come into being and to be
governed by Abdullah with ongoing assistance from the British. The territory quickly developed
a rentier economic system thanks to economic subsidies provided by the British in return for
Abdullah’s alliance. The rentier economic system helped Abdullah to consolidate his power and
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engage in an eventual process of state creation. Society at the time, however, remained largely
tribally structured.

Jordan Hypothesis 2: The enduring tribal structure of society hindered the ability of the
central Transjordanian leadership to consolidate its power.

The aforementioned condition, however, was counterbalanced by,

Jordan Hypothesis 3: Foreign economic subsidies facilitated the creation of a rentier
economic system in the territory. Transjordan’s rentier economic system helped the
central leadership to consolidate its power, increase core-periphery ties, and initiate the
state creation process.

Saudi Arabia

Like Jordan, Saudi Arabia was a vast region with a tribally structured society prior to its
creation as a state. However, unlike Jordan, the state did not form as the result of foreign powers
carving out its borders. Additionally, the Ottoman Empire had less influence and control of the
region than in Jordan given the distance of the Arabian Peninsula from the center of Ottoman
power. A defining event in the region was the birth of Islam. This event cemented the
peninsula’s, and eventual state’s, status as a destination point. Another key development in the
region was the Al Saud tribe’s alliance with the Wahhabis. This alliance helped the Al Saud
tribe consolidate its power in the peninsula and helped it to eventually initiate a process of state
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creation. Saudi Arabia’s early processes are similar to those of Jordan, with some additional
nuances.

Saudi Arabia Hypothesis 1: The vast territory and tribal structure of society, prevented
elites from effectively consolidating their power in order to initiate a process of state
creation.

Despite the aforementioned factor, other conditions undercut its significance. The following
factors were not present in the case of Jordan. Though the nature of society in Jordan was
homogenous, this condition was not as significant in Jordan’s early history as it was in Saudi
Arabia’s:

Saudi Arabia Hypothesis 2: The homogenous nature of society helped the central
leadership of the Al Saud tribe to consolidate its power and increase core-periphery ties.

Saudi Arabia Hypothesis 3: The alliance between the Al Saud tribe and the Wahhabis
gave the Al Saud tribe legitimacy that helped it to consolidate its power across the
peninsula.

After World War I, the Al Saud tribe was able to gain control of the Hejaz and thus the
cities of Mecca and Medina. The discovery of oil in the early 20 th century, and resulting Western
purchases of oil, created a rentier economic system in the territory. The rentier economic system
helped Ibn Saud to consolidate his power and carry out the state creation process. In addition,
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the creation of the ikhwan, Ibn Saud’s personal army, helped him consolidate his power and
increase ties between his center of power in Riyadh and the tribal periphery.
These two conditions differ from the conditions present in the case of Jordan in the
period after World War I. Though Jordan was a rentier economic system, it was one based on
foreign recognition of a strategic regional alliance rather than on foreign exploitation of a
lucrative natural resource. Additionally, though in Transjordan Abdullah also had an army, the
ikhwan was able to provide Ibn Saud with religious legitimacy in addition to being a regular
army.

Saudi Arabia Hypothesis 4: The discovery and sale of oil to Western powers created a
rentier economic system in the territory controlled by Ibn Saud. Oil rents enabled Ibn
Saud to expand and consolidate his power within the peninsula.

Saudi Arabia Hypothesis 5: The ikhwan, which was responsible for helping to increase
ties between tribal populations and the central leadership, constituted an important force
in the consolidation of Ibn Saud’s power.

Iran

Iran underwent many of the same processes prior to its creation as a state that Jordan and Saudi
Arabia did. Like Saudi Arabia, the eventual state was not created by foreign powers physically
setting the borders. However, foreign powers did play a role in Iran’s creation as a state in other
ways. Furthermore, as was the case in Jordan and Saud Arabia, the territory of the Persian
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Empire was vast, and society was structured along tribal lines. Prior to state creation, the Persian
Empire was subject to a cycle of conquerors and this cycle greatly affected the process of power
consolidation in the region. Furthermore, unlike either Jordan or Saudi Arabia, in Persia there
was a strong sense of cultural identity in the region even prior to state creation. This identity was
based on the endurance of a pre-Islamic Persian culture and language. Finally, a center point in
the region was cemented well before Iran’s creation as a state with the establishment of Tehran
as the capital under the Qajars. Thus, Iran’s early processes are similar to those in Jordan and
Saudi Arabia, though with some additional factors.

Iran Hypothesis 1: The vastness of the region, the constant cycle of conquering, and the
tribal structure of society hindered the ability of elites to effectively consolidate their
power and initiate the state creation process.

Unlike Jordan or Saudi Arabia, the following conditions were true in Iran prior to state creation
:
Iran Hypothesis 2: The role of Persian elites in each new conqueror’s administration
ensured the endurance of Persian language and culture. In turn, the language and culture
eventually formed the foundation of a national identity.

Iran Hypothesis 3: The establishment of Tehran as the capital of the region gave the
region’s leadership a point around which to consolidate its power. This development
aided with the future state creation process.
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A pivotal event in Iran prior to the creation of the state was the 1906 Constitutional
Revolution. Neither Jordan nor Saudi Arabia experienced attempts prior to state creation to
establish a constitution and increase political liberalization within the existing political system.
Furthermore, as was the case in Saudi Arabia, a rentier economic system developed in the region
due to foreign oil purchases. Unlike in Saudi Arabia, where oil rents allowed the Al Saud tribe
to begin to rapidly consolidate its power even prior to state creation, oil rents in Iran did not play
a large role in regional development until the state creation period, and thus I do not posit a
hypothesis about this factor for Iran at this time.

Iran Hypothesis 4: The 1906 Constitutional Revolution established a legislative body,
elections, albeit with partial suffrage, and political parties. These developments increased
political liberalization.

Initial State Creation and Regime Building

Jordan

Jordan became an independent state in 1946. During the 1940s and 1950s, the Jordanian state
became cemented and unchallenged internationally or domestically. However, political unity
was not so easily achieved. The regime in Jordan was a monarchy led by King Abdullah. In the
1950s, there was a marginal increase in political participation and contestation levels, yet by the
1960s, these changes came to an end in favor of regime stability and security. The three most
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influential events in the 1940s and 1950s in Jordan were the end of World War II, the ArabIsraeli war, and the creation of the 1952 Constitution. The rentier economic system in Jordan
also affected its state creation process and power consolidation, as well as the political climate in
the new state.

Jordan Hypothesis 4: The losses suffered by Britain during World War II decreased its
ability to take an active role in Jordan and, as a result, increased Jordan’s autonomy.

Jordan Hypothesis 5: The large influx of Palestinians after the 1948 war set the
foundation for future domestic instability. This development undermined political unity
in the state.

In terms of developments within the political regime of the new state:

Jordan Hypothesis 6: The creation of the 1952 Constitution laid the foundation for
increased political participation and contestation. This development increased political
liberalization.

Undercutting the aforementioned political development was the following factor:

Jordan Hypothesis 7: Jordan’s transformation into a rentier state, combined with a
monarchical regime structure, prevented the regime from being accountable to its
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population. This lack of accountability hindered political participation and contestation
and precluded political liberalization.

Saudi Arabia

After working to consolidate his power during the 1920s, Ibn Saud established the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia in 1932. He declared himself king and established a monarchy comprised of his
family members. Unlike in Jordan, the monarchy was inextricably linked with religion. The
ulema had significant influence within the regime, and Wahhabism provided the regime with a
source of legitimacy. As in Jordan, the rentier economic system that had developed in the early
20th century greatly shaped the state creation process of Saudi Arabia. However, Saudi Arabia’s
rentier economic system was based on oil, while Jordan’s was not. Ibn Saud was able to rapidly
consolidate state power and modernize in a way that would not have been possible without oil
rents. As was the case in Jordan, the rentier economic system of the new state affected its
political climate. World War II pushed Allied powers to increase oil purchases, which resulted in
massive amounts of oil wealth flowing into the Saudi territory. The exponential increase in oil
wealth had a number of effects on Saudi Arabia’s political regime.
In terms of the state creation process and consolidation of state power, the two following
factors demonstrate how Saudi Arabia’s processes differed from those of Jordan:
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Saudi Arabia Hypothesis 6: The Saudi/Wahhabi alliance lent the central Saudi leadership
legitimacy that allowed it to effectively consolidate its power, initiate a process of state
creation, and create a cohesive state national identity.

Saudi Arabia Hypothesis 7: Oil wealth enabled the regime to expand state bureaucracies
in the 1950s and 1960s. This development increased the consolidation of state power.

In terms of the political climate in Saudi Arabia, the following factor was relevant:

Saudi Arabia Hypothesis 8: Saudi Arabia’s rentier economic system, combined with its
monarchical regime structure, hindered the regime’s accountability to the population.
This lack of accountability prevented political participation and contestation and, thus,
precluded political liberalization.

Iran

Unlike Jordan, but similar to Saudi Arabia, the state of Iran was created without foreign
intervention to set the state borders. However, the British were responsible for prepping Reza
Khan to overthrow the Qajars and initiate a process of state creation in 1921. Reza used oil rents
from foreign oil purchases to rapidly consolidate state power and modernize the country. He
established an authoritarian regime, and continued to use Persian identity as a socially unifying
force in the new state. Different to either Jordan or Saudi Arabia’s regime, Iran’s regime
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continued to evolve throughout the next few decades. After World War II and the loss of Reza’s
ally, Germany, the Iranian authoritarian regime became increasingly unstable.
The role of oil rents in the state creation process in Iran was similar to the role that rents
played in both Jordan and Saudi Arabia’s state creation processes. However, a strong cultural
identity was a factor of state creation present in Iran but not in either Jordan or Saudi Arabia.

Iran Hypothesis 5: Foreign oil purchases, which created a rentier economic system,
enabled Reza to rapidly consolidate the power of the state and modernize the country.

Iran Hypothesis 6: A strong sense of Persian identity formed the basis of a national
identity and aided Reza in consolidating the power of the state.

In terms of political climate, Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia shared the following characteristic:

Iran Hypothesis 7: A rentier economic system, combined with an authoritarian regime
structure, hindered the regime’s accountability to the population. This lack of
accountability hindered political participation and contestation and precluded political
liberalization.

Evolution of the Political Regime

Though the state was firmly cemented by the mid 20th century in each of the three states, the
political regime, and political and social climates in each one continued to evolve. Often, as in
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the case of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, regional events shaped the evolution of their respective
political and social climates. It is important to note that in neither of these cases did the actual
political regime type change. In the case of Iran, however, foreign intervention brought about
domestic instability and political change, which eventually engendered change in the structure of
the political regime.

Jordan

The 1960s and 1970s in Jordan were a time of domestic unrest fueled by its position in the
region. The 1967 war threatened Jordan’s domestic stability, which led King Hussein to declare
martial law. This action quelled political activity. He was forced to lift martial law in 1989 in
response to an economic downturn and popular calls for greater political participation. Twentytwo years after martial law had been implemented, political activity was once again permitted,
signaling a slight increase in political liberalization. Another important measure for political
liberalization that took place was the granting of voting rights to women in 1974. Though this
measure helped increase political participation, the political regime remained unchanged.

Jordan Hypothesis 8: The prioritization of domestic stability and regime security in the
face of regional instability led King Hussein to impose martial law. His decision abruptly
stymied political participation and contestation, which hindered political liberalization.

Later, however, two events marginally reversed the effects of martial law on the liberalization of
the political system:
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Jordan Hypothesis 9: Women gaining the right to vote in 1974 increased political
participation. This development marginally increased political liberalization.

Jordan Hypothesis 10: The economic downturn and resulting popular demands for
change led King Hussein to lift martial law. As a result, participation and contestation
levels increased.

Saudi Arabia

As was the case in Jordan, regional events challenged the domestic stability and political climate
in Saudi Arabia. In the case of Saudi Arabia, it was one major international event that disrupted
its political stability: the Iranian Revolution. The Iranian Revolution challenged the Islamic
hegemony of the Saudi regime. The revolution also contributed significantly to social changes
within Saudi society. These changes impacted the participation of women in society. In Jordan,
regional instability led the regime to enact significant political changes for the whole of society.
To appease the population, those changes were later reversed by the regime in favor of
marginally increased political liberalization. In Saudi Arabia, however, regional events led the
regime to make significant changes in society that disenfranchised half of the population. In
addition, the Saudi regime never attempted to appease the population, as had the Jordanian
regime had, by increasing political participation. Again, as in the case of Jordan, it is important
to note that the political regime type in Saudi Arabia did not change at this time.
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Saudi Arabia Hypothesis 9: The 1979 Iranian Revolution, which pushed Saudi Arabia to
become more socially conservative, fostered domestic conditions that largely excluded
half the population. The lack of social participation for women hindered the potential for
political liberalization in Saudi Arabia.

Iran

With the rise in contestation that occurred after World War II in Iran, Mossadegh’s Leftist party
was able to gain power. Mossadegh promised and implemented political reforms, such as
increased political participation. However, Mossadegh’s efforts to reform the political system in
Iran were cut short. Unlike Jordan and Saudi Arabia, foreign intervention impacted Iran’s
political regime long after the process of state creation had taken place. In 1953, the CIA
launched a coup against Mossadegh’s Leftist government to oust him. The event would
eventually transform Iran’s political regime. Unlike in Jordan or Saudi Arabia, the coup did
cause Iran’s political regime type to change.

Iran Hypothesis 8: Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh’s platform of political reform
and nationalizing Iran’s oil marginally increased political liberalization.

The decision severely undercut the power of Iran’s duly elected political leader. This type of
intervention did not take place in either Jordan or Saudi Arabia:
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Iran Hypothesis 9: The CIA-initiated coup that overthrew Mossadegh abruptly stymied
any political liberalization that had occurred during his tenure as prime minister.

The major repercussion of the 1953 coup was not felt until 1979, when the Iranian
Revolution took place. The revolution was in response to a rise in anti-West sentiment and anger
at the Shah. Before the revolution, the Shah had attempted to save face with the population by
granting women the right to vote, amongst other political reforms. These measures were not
enough to appease the population. Unlike in Jordan or Saudi Arabia, the political regime type in
Iran did change as a result of the 1979 revolution. In power, Ayatollah Khomeini created a
theocracy based on politicized Shiism. As a result, there was an exponential rise in the role of
the religious establishment within the government. The creation of the theocracy was
accompanied by social changes for half the country’s population.

Iran Hypothesis 10: Women gaining the right to vote in 1963 increased political
participation. This development marginally increased political liberalization.

Severely undercutting the aforementioned factor, a development that did not occur in either
Jordan or Saudi Arabia, was the following:

Iran Hypothesis 11: The Iranian Revolution resulted in a theocratic Shia regime. The
theocracy headed by Ayatollah Khomeini decreased political participation and
contestation in Iran’s political processes. This development stymied political
liberalization.
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Present Day Conditions

Jordan

The climate of political liberalization initiated in Jordan in 1989 did not endure. Today, there is
full participation, but levels of participation in elections, and levels of contestation, i.e., political
parties with real power, remain low. In addition, civil society remains weak. The recent
establishment of the IEC has increased the freeness and fairness of elections. Although Jordan is
the case in which there has been the most political liberalization, there are still few indications
that it can, or will, politically liberalize further.

Jordan Hypothesis 11: The creation of the IEC and its role in monitoring the freeness
and fairness of elections has lent transparency to Jordanian elections. This development
is an important foundation for the potential creation of a democratic regime.

Saudi Arabia

Recently, the regime has initiated economic and social changes. Women were granted the right
to vote in local elections in 2011 and will be able to drive as of June 2018. Additionally, the
current Crown Prince is looking to find alternative sources of energy and revenue for the Saudi
economy to reduce the country’s reliance on oil. Despite these developments, there is no
indication at present that the regime will engage in political liberalization. Political participation
and contestation remain almost non-existent and civil society remains weak. A major factor that
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undermines democratization in Saudi Arabia is a prevalent anti-West view amongst its people.
This condition is not present in Jordan.

Saudi Arabia Hypothesis 10: Anti-West sentiment and the conviction that democracy is
an inherently Western concept, combined with a weak civil society, decrease the chance
that the people will call for greater political liberalization.

In recent years, however, there have been indications that certain emerging conditions could
undercut the aforementioned factors’ impact on political liberalization.

Saudi Arabia Hypothesis 11: Recent changes vis-à-vis the status of women in society
indicates a slow, but positive, trend toward greater participation of women socially.
These developments indicate the potential, albeit small, for increased political
liberalization.

Iran
As in Saudi Arabia, the people of Iran do not have a favorable view of the US. Unlike the Saudi
Arabian regime, the Iranian regime’s view of the US is also unfavorable. Tensions have
increased between Iran and the US over Iran’s nuclear program. Iran and Saudi Arabia also
continue to vie for regional hegemony. In the political sphere, the theocracy remains strong, and
political participation and contestation remain low in the country. In addition, civil society
remains weak.
As in the case of Saudi Arabia, the following condition is present in the case of Iran:
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Iran Hypothesis 12: Increased anti-Western sentiment and the view that democracy is an
inherently Western concept, combined with a weak civil society, decrease the chances
that the population will call for greater political liberalization.

GENERAL HYPOTHESES

Having conducted a comparative analysis of the time period-specific hypotheses of the processes
of state creation, regime building, and democratization in each of the three cases, I now derive
some tentative general conclusions. The following hypotheses are what I infer from the case of
Jordan, and how the cases of Saudi Arabia and Iran substantiate, refute, or add nuance to the
basic theoretical framework. I start by stating the general hypothesis and then proceed to add an
explanation.

General Hypothesis 1: In the Middle East, a deep-rooted tribal structure in society have
hindered the ability of elites to consolidate their power and initiate a process of state
creation.

In their respective work, both Linz and Owen discuss the impact of a tribal social system
on the state and the regime. Linz more broadly outlines a tribal system of authority, and Owen
posits specifically that family rule continues in places with strong historical tribal structures.
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Owen’s claim seems to be substantiated by the cases of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, however he
does not discuss an additional impact of a tribal social structure: its role in the processes of state
creation and power consolidation. A tribal social structure was present in all three cases outlined
in this study and impacted the process of state creation and power consolidation in each case. As
in Jordan, the tribal structure of society in Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively prevented the elites
in the central leadership from coming together to consolidate its power and initiate a process of
state creation.

General Hypothesis 2: In the Middle East, a homogeneous population helps central
leadership to establish core-periphery ties, consolidate its power, and initiate a process of
state creation.

As Tilly discusses, a homogenous population is a necessary prerequisite of state creation
and power consolidation. The cases of Saudi Arabia and Iran both substantiate this condition. In
these cases, as in Jordan, the population was homogenous, so when a process of state creation
began, the homogenous nature of society made the process easier.

General Hypothesis 3: In the Middle East, a rentier economic system, combined with a
monarchical or authoritarian regime structure, decreases the regime’s accountability to
the population. This lack of accountability hinders political participation and contestation
and precludes political liberalization.
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Karl discusses the role that natural resources, namely oil, play in state formation. Owen
discusses the impact of a rentier economic system on the expansion of state power in many
Middle Eastern states. However, neither analyst makes an argument about the effect that a
rentier economic system combined with a monarchical or an authoritarian regime type has on the
political system of a state. It is important to recognize that it is only a rentier economic system in
combination with a monarchical or an authoritarian regime type that leads to a decrease in
political participation and contestation. The aforementioned condition is present in both Saudi
Arabia and Iran. However, the nature of the rentier economic system is different in all three
cases. In Jordan, the rentier economic system is based on foreign subsidies provided in return for
the Jordanian regime’s strategic alliance. Saudi Arabia is a rentier economic system in the
traditional sense. It receives foreign aid in return for providing a lucrative natural resource, oil.
Finally, Iran’s rentier economic system more closely matches that of Saudi Arabia’s: it is based
on foreign purchases of oil, though it has diversified its economy more so than Saudi Arabia.

General Hypothesis 4: In the Middle East, strongman rulers are good, even necessary, for
stable state creation, but in the long run, they hinder democratization.
General Hypothesis 4a: Authoritarian measures, such as implementing martial
law, reduce participation and contestation levels, prohibit the development of a
civil society, and hinder political liberalization.
General Hypothesis 4b: Pressure from below to improve social and economic
conditions within the state can sometimes result in regime-initiated changes
toward greater political liberalization.
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As to be expected, authoritarianism damages the process of democratization within a
state. The aforementioned conditions that were present in Jordan were also present in the cases
of Saudi Arabia and Iran, with a few important revisions. In Saudi Arabia, the regime never
imposed a period of martial law on the country as the regime in Jordan did. After the Iranian
Revolution, the Saudi regime increased the conservative nature of society, but this action was not
the same as imposing martial law. Furthermore, it is important to note that Saudi Arabia has
never experienced popular pressure to improve the social or economic conditions within the
state. As a result, the regime has never initiated political changes or liberalization in an effort to
appease the population. Iran has also never experienced a period of martial law. However, there
were periods in its 20th century history in which there was more or less political openness, as in
the case of Jordan. Furthermore, Iran, like Jordan, experienced a period of pressure from the
population to change the political system. Popular calls to alter the political system resulted in
the 1906 Constitutional Revolution and greater political liberalization. The Iranian Revolution
generated a popular call for political change but it did not result in increased political
liberalization. The result was the opposite -- the resulting theocracy decreased levels of political
participation and contestation.
The theoretical framework derived from the analysis of Jordan is not enough to fully
explain the processes of state creation and regime building in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Iran.
I begin with the nuances to the basic theoretical framework provided by the case of Saudi
Arabia. From the case of Saudi Arabia, I add:

General Hypothesis 5: A regime’s use of religion to legitimize its authority in a highly
religious society helps consolidate the power of the state.
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Tilly discusses the importance of homogeneity of religion in state building. He makes
the claim that having a uniform religion amongst the population renders the process of state
creation easier. In all three cases presented in this study, the majority of the population was
Muslim, whether Sunni in Jordan, Wahhabi in Saudi Arabia, or Twelver Shia in Iran. In other
words, there was homogeneity of religion present in all three cases. What makes the case of
Saudi Arabia unique is the role that religion played in the state creation process. The Al Saud
tribe used religion as a tool of legitimacy right from the initial process of state creation. In
Jordan and Iran, religion was not used as a tool in initial state creation. Both states were
originally created as secular states. Religion was a tool of legitimization in Saudi Arabia’s
regime building process as well as in its process of state creation. In Jordan, religion has not
been an influence in the regime building process. In Iran, though religion did not play a role in
the initial regime building process of the early state, religion came to play an important role in
regime building leading up to, and after, the 1979 revolution. Shiism had remained a large part
of the bazaar class’s identity even throughout Iran’s secular regimes, and anger with the Shah’s
regime caused a resurgence in religiosity that resulted in the 1979 revolution. After 1979, the
regime in Iran became inextricably linked with religion.
Another factor that was present in the case of Saudi Arabia, and that adds nuance to the
basic theoretical framework, is the following:

General Hypothesis 6: The view of democracy as an inherently Western concept,
combined with prevalent anti-Western sentiment and a weak civil society, decreases the
chance that the population will call for greater political liberalization.
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Nowhere in existing literature on this subject is the connection drawn between a lack of
civil society and the population’s view of the West and democracy, and how this combination of
factors affects the likelihood of political liberalization. In Jordan, there is less prevalent popular
dislike of the West than exists amongst the populations of Saudi Arabia and Iran. Thus, it
follows that Jordan is the country that has experienced the most political liberalization, and in
which, at the moment, further political liberalization seems most likely. The case of Iran
substantiates this hypothesis based on the case of Saudi Arabia.
The theoretical framework derived from the analysis of Jordan and Saudi Arabia is still
not enough to fully explain the processes of state creation and regime building in the case of Iran.
From the case of Iran, I add:

General Hypothesis 7: A strong, enduring, sense of cultural identity provides an
important foundation for a national identity. This sense of identity strengthens the
leadership’s ability to consolidate the power of the state.

Tilly discusses the role of ethnic homogeneity, but that is not quite the same as the
argument I pose here. In all three cases presented in this study there was religious, linguistic,
and ethnic homogeneity. What I am arguing, however, is that a strong sense of common culture
bound together the Iranian population, whereas a sense of common culture was lacking in Jordan
and Saudi Arabia at the outset of their respective state creation processes. Though the regime in
Iran came to be connected to religion later in the 20th century, a common culture in Iran aided
with the initial process of state creation and power consolidation. Furthermore, some authors
discuss the role of Islamic identity and religion in the state and nation building of ‘the Middle
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East’. However, none of the authors explicitly identifies the role of Iran’s non-religious Persian
linguistic and cultural identity in shaping Iran’s processes of state creation and consolidation of
power.
Another factor that was present in the case of Iran, and that adds nuance to the basic
theoretical framework, is the following:

General Hypothesis 8: Foreign intervention to initiate regime change infringes on the
sovereignty of a state and can alter the nature of the regime. The instability created by
this type of intervention can hinder political participation and contestation and preclude
political liberalization.

In their respective work, Owen, Milton-Edwards, and Bromley all discuss the role that
foreign powers played in the physical creation of many Middle Eastern states, and the economic,
military, and political aid that foreign powers provided to the nascent states. However, the CIA’s
intervention in Iran does not qualify as this type of intervention. Of the cases outlined in this
study, Iran was the only one to experience foreign intervention to alter the structure of the regime
well after its initial processes of state creation, power consolidation, and regime building had
occurred. The US’s intervention shaped Iran’s political system and the nature of its regime.
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CONCLUSIONS

Having derived a tentative theoretical framework from the three cases and having demonstrated
how the cases of Saudi Arabia and Iran build upon the case of Jordan, I now summarize my
findings for each case. At the end, I provide some concluding thoughts about areas for future
research.
The tribal nature of Jordanian society, its artificial creation as a state by foreign powers,
its rentier economic system, and the monarchical regime lead me to derive some tentative
arguments about state creation, regime building, and democratization in Jordan. The tribal
nature of society prevented the effective consolidation of elite power in the region prior to the
20th century. When the British set the boundaries of the eventual state after World War I, this
action and the rentier economic nature of the state expedited the process of state creation in
Jordan. British rents helped Abdullah to consolidate his power in the territory and increase coreperiphery ties that linked rural populations to his center of power in Amman. British rents
helped Abdullah to overcome the tribal structure of society to initiate a process of state creation
and consolidation of state power.
Abdullah built was a secular monarchical regime without the aid of religion. While there
were no outright checks on the king’s power, the 1952 Constitution established by Talal
provided for executive, legislative, and judiciary institutions. The king filled most of the
positions in these institutions, however the lower house of parliament did provide Jordanians
with an outlet for expressing their political opinions. Women, however, could not vote. The
impact of the monarchical regime on political liberalization in the country was magnified by the
rentier economic system. Political participation and contestation were severely limited by the
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lack of accountability that the regime felt toward its people because they did not generate the
country’s economic revenue. This lack of accountability prevented full political participation
and contestation and thus hindered full political liberalization.
Measures such as the imposition of martial law under King Hussein also severely limited
political liberalization by restraining political participation and contestation. The regime has not
been completely impervious to popular calls for greater political liberalization, however. Martial
law was brought to an end by popular calls for greater political participation and contestation in
response to an economic downturn. The regime, in order to preserve its stability, reinstated
elections and political parties. Women getting the right to vote in 1974 was also an important
measure for increasing participation within the political system. These measures to appease the
population worked and are unique to the case of Jordan. Popular calls for increased political
liberalization, however, were ultimately unsuccessful in Iran and there have never been any such
initiatives in Saudi Arabia. Though levels of political participation and contestation are currently
higher in Jordan than in either Saudi Arabia or Iran, they are not high enough to meet Dahl’s
criteria of a polyarchy.
Another criterion of democracy, free and fair elections, has only recently come about in
Jordan with the creation of the IEC. Prior to that, elections were often mired in opacity and
favoritism. The work of the IEC is beginning to help Jordan achieve this criterion of democracy,
yet there is still further to go to achieve full freeness and fairness of elections. Additionally, civil
society is weak. This means that it is difficult for the population to challenge the political status
quo.
Many of the same factors and conditions of state creation, regime building, and
democratization that are present in the case of Jordan are also present in the case of Saudi

116

Arabia. However, the role of religion in the processes of state creation and regime building, and
an anti-West view amongst the population, must be included in the case of Saudi Arabia. As in
Jordan, the tribal nature of society prevented full consolidation of elite power prior to state
creation. However, it was not foreign delineation of borders that eventually initiated a process of
state creation. Instead, the Al Saud tribe was successful in using Wahhabism to gain legitimacy
with tribal populations and to consolidate its power in the peninsula. Ibn Saud used the
letigimacy affored by Wahhabism, combined with a rentier economic system, as was also present
in the case of Jordan, to engage in a process of state creation. The process of state creation in
Saudi Arabia differed from that of Jordan because of the use of religion to help the central
leadership consolidate its power.
The monarchical regime structure that developed in Saudi Arabia, combined with a
rentier economic system had the same effect as this set of conditions in Jordan -- the regime felt
no accountability to the population, which hindered political participation, contestation and.
consequently, political liberalization. Unlike in Jordan, the regime in Saudi Arabia developed
with the aid of religion as a tool of legitimization. The close links between religion and the
regime have given the religious establishment power within the Saudi regime that the religious
establishment in Jordan does not enjoy. Furthermore, unlike in Jordan, in which the regime was
forced to marginally liberalize the political system in response to popular pressure, the Saudi
regime has never experienced such pressure from the population. As a result, there has been no
trend toward greater regime-initiated political liberalization in Saudi Arabia as there has been in
Jordan. Why is this the case? Often regimes will increase political liberalization in response to
not only negative social or economic conditions, but also to increased economic prosperity as
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well.452 Saudi Arabia is incredibly economically prosperous thanks to oil wealth, yet the
aforementioned development has not taken place.
As in Jordan, civil society in Saudi Arabia is weak. However, this condition, combined
with an anti-West view prevalent amongst the population, means that democracy is hindered in a
way that it is not in Jordan. A weak civil society means that the population is unable to
challenge the political status quo. This factor, combined with a lack of desire for
democratization, decreases the chance that political liberalization will occur. Furthermore, of
the cases presented in this study, Saudi Arabia granted women the right to vote the latest; not
until 2011. Since then, there have been increased social equalities granted to women. Whether
there is a connection between these changes and an increase in political liberalization remains to
be seen. The Saudi political system meets almost none of the prerequisites for polyarchy as
outlined by Dahl.
Many of the factors present in the cases of Jordan and Saudi Arabia are also present in
the case of Iran. However, Iran is the most multilayered case presented in this study. The role of
an enduring cultural and linguistic identity, foreign intervention in the political regime well after
state creation, and many regime transformations, including the most recent change to a
theocracy, lead me to draw conclusions about nuances in the case of Iran. The tribal structure of
society prevented the consolidation of elite power prior to state creation. As in the case of Saudi
Arabia, foreign powers did not physically delineate the state of Iran. However, the British did
prep the eventual leader of the Iranian state to launch a coup and oust the Qajar leadership. As
in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, a rentier economic system, one based on foreign purchases of oil
like in Saudi Arabia, allowed Reza to rapidly consolidate his power and to engage in a process of
state creation and modernization. However, unlike in either of the two previous cases, a strong
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sense of non-religious Persian identity aided Reza with a process of state creation. Though
religion would come to play a large role in the state later on, at the inception of the state, it was
an enduring sense of Persian cultural and linguistic identity that formed the basis of a national
identity.
The initial regime type of the state was an authoritarian one. A rentier economic system
combined with this regime type had the same effect as a monarchical regime type combined with
a rentier economic system in Jordan and Saudi Arabia: participation and contestation were
limited and political liberalization was obstructed. However, as in Jordan, the population in Iran
has an outlet for voicing a political opinion. The constitution established in 1906, and the
revised one created by Ayatollah Khomeini, provide for the institutions of a parliament,
elections, and political parties.
The regime in Iran has changed in a much more radical manner than those of Jordan or
Saudi Arabia. After World War II, the population used its limited political power to elect a
Leftist/Communist party. The party’s platform was one of greater political participation, but its
plans were abruptly stymied when the CIA intervened to oust the leader of the party, Mohammad
Mossadegh. Foreign intervention in the regime well after state creation was a unique occurrence
in Iran. Neither Jordan nor Saudi Arabia experienced such intervention in the trajectory of their
respective regimes. The outcome of this intervention was yet another regime change twenty-six
years later. The Iranian Revolution, fueled by a strong anti-West sentiment, resulted in the
development of a theocratic regime. The theocracy endures today, and though the majles and
political party activity endure, the religious establishment has severely checked political
participation and contestation. Interestingly, Iran granted women the right to vote the earliest of
the three cases presented in this study.
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As is the case in Saudi Arabia, anti-West sentiment is strong amongst the population of
Iran and within the regime. In addition, as in both the previous cases, civil society is weak and
the population is unable to challenge the political status quo. This condition, combined with a
strong anti-West view, has the same effect as these two conditions do in Saudi Arabia: they
decrease the chance that the population will push for political liberalization. Furthermore, the
inextricable link between the regime and the religious establishment has limited political
participation and contestation. Furthermore, another criterion for democracy, free and fair
elections, is not being entirely met in Iran. Elections under the theocracy have been mired in
opacity, illegitimacy, and favoritism. However, unlike in Saudi Arabia, but similar to Jordan,
Iran does have precedent of the population calling for greater political liberalization and regime
change. Perhaps this precedent will translate into yet another regime transformation in the
future. At the moment, low participation and contestation, and the lack of free and fair elections
prevent Iran from meeting Dahl’s criteria of polyarchy. In all three cases, it will be important to
continue to monitor social, economic, and political conditions to see if there are indications in
the future of greater political liberalization.

Future Research

This study leaves room for future studies to build upon. One way in which this study could be
expanded would be to take on a similar process of analysis and theory creation for countries in
the Middle East not examined here. Another way in which this study could be expanded upon
would be to continue the analysis of the cases presented here in the future. This study can only
examine the cases up to a certain point in their respective histories. Naturally, the political,
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social, and economic conditions in these three countries will continue to evolve in the future, and
any changes will be worth examining. For example, if there ever were to be popular protest for
increased political liberalization in Saudi Arabia, as has never happened before, this would be a
major development for the political climate of the country and would be important to delve into.
There is also room to, in the future, engage more extensively with literature on the
Middle East so as to build upon, and add additional nuance to, the arguments presented in this
study. This study has placed the cases in a global context. However, there is room to further
examine the domestic conditions that shaped the processes of state creation and regime building
in each country.
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